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We provide a comprehensive review of China’s financial system, and explore directions of future 
development.  First, the financial system has been dominated by a large banking sector.  In recent years banks 
have made considerable progress in reducing the amount of non-performing loans and improving their 
efficiency.  Second, the role of the stock market in allocating resources in the economy has been limited and 
ineffective.  We discuss issues related to the further development of China’s stock market and other financial 
markets.  Third, the most successful part of the financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the 
overall economy, is a non-standard sector that consists of alternative financing channels, governance 
mechanisms, and institutions.  The co-existence of this sector with banks and markets can continue to support 
the growth of the Hybrid Sector (non-state, non-listed firms).  Finally, among the policies that will help to 
sustain stable economic growth in China are those that reduce the likelihood of damaging financial crises, 
including a banking sector crisis, a real estate or stock market crash, and a “twin crisis” in the currency market 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper we provide a comprehensive review of China’s financial system and extensive 
comparisons with other countries.  Almost every functioning financial system includes financial 
markets and intermediaries (e.g., a banking sector), but how these two standard financial sectors 
contribute to the entire financial system and economy differs significantly across different countries.  
In this regard, we discuss what has worked and what has not within the two sectors, and consider the 
effects of further development on the entire economy.  We also examine a non-standard financial 
sector, which operates outside the markets and banking sectors and consists of alternative financing 
channels, governance mechanisms, and institutions.  Finally, we provide guidelines for future 
research on several unresolved issues, including how China’s financial system can integrate into the 
world’s markets and economy without being interrupted by damaging financial crises.  Although 
there is no consensus regarding the prospects for China’s future economic growth, a prevailing view 
on China’s financial system speculates that it is one of the weakest links in the economy and it will 
hamper future economic growth.       
We draw four main conclusions about China’s financial system and its future development.   
First, when we examine and compare China’s banking system and financial markets with those of 
both developed and emerging countries, we find China’s financial system has been dominated by a 
large banking system.  Even with the entrance and growth of many domestic and foreign banks and 
financial institutions in recent years, China’s banking system is still mainly controlled by the four 
largest state-owned banks.  All of these ‘Big Four’ banks have become publicly listed and traded 
companies in recent years, with the government being the largest shareholder and retaining control.  
This ownership structure has served these banks well in terms of avoiding major problems 
encountered by major financial institutions in developed countries that are at the center of the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis.  Moreover, the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) over GDP has been 
steadily decreasing after reaching its peak during 2000- 2001.  Continuing improvement of the 
banking system, including further development of financial institutions outside the Big Four banks 
and extending more credit to productive firms and projects, can help stabilize China’s financial 
system in the short run, given the uncertainties in the Chinese and global economies.   
Our second conclusion concerns China’s financial markets.  Two domestic stock exchanges, 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE hereafter) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were 
established in 1990.  Their scale and importance are not comparable to the banking sector; and they 
have not been effective in allocating resources in the economy, in that they remain speculative and   3 
driven by insider trading.  In recent years the stock market has witnessed significant development. 
Going forward, financial markets are likely to play an increasingly significant role in the economy.  
We discuss several issues and potential problems related to increasing the size and scope and 
improving the efficiency of the stock and other financial markets.   
Third, in an earlier paper, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005, AQQ hereafter) find that the most 
successful part of the financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the overall economy, is 
not the banking sector or financial markets, but rather a sector of alternative financing channels, such 
as informal financial intermediaries, internal financing and trade credits, and coalitions of various 
forms among firms, investors, and local governments.  Many of these financing channels rely on 
alternative governance mechanisms, such as competition in product and input markets, and trust, 
reputation and relationships.  Together this alternative financial sector has supported the growth of a 
“Hybrid Sector” with various types of ownership structures.  Our definition of the Hybrid Sector 
includes all non-state, non-listed firms, including privately or individually owned firms, and firms 
that are partially owned by local governments (e.g., Township Village Enterprises or TVEs).
1  The 
growth of the Hybrid Sector has been much higher than that of the State Sector (state-owned 
enterprises or SOEs, and all firms where the central government has ultimate control) and the Listed 
Sector (publicly listed and traded firms with most of them converted from the State Sector). The 
Hybrid Sector contributes most of China’s economic growth, and employs the majority of the labor 
force.  The co-existence of the alternative financial sector with banks and markets can continue to 
fuel the growth of the Hybrid Sector.   
Finally, a significant challenge for China’s financial system is to avoid damaging financial 
crises that can severely disrupt the economy and social stability.  These crises include traditional 
financial crises: a banking sector crisis stemming from an accumulation of NPLs and a sudden drop 
in banks’ profits; or a crisis/crash resulting from speculative asset bubbles in the real estate market or 
stock market.  There are also other types of financial crises, such as a “twin crisis” (simultaneous 
foreign exchange and banking/stock market crises) that struck many Asian economies in the late 
1990s.  Since its entrance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the integration of China’s 
financial system and overall economy with the rest of the world has significantly sped up.  This 
process introduces cheap foreign capital and technology, but large scale and sudden capital flows and 
                                                           
1 We include firms partially owned by local governments in the Hybrid Sector for two reasons. First, despite the 
ownership stake of local governments and the sometimes ambiguous ownership structure and property rights, the 
operation of these firms resembles more closely that of a for-profit, privately-owned firm than that of a state-owned firm. 
Second, the ownership stake of local governments in many of these firms has been privatized.   4 
foreign speculation increase the likelihood of a twin crisis.  At the end of 2007, China’s foreign 
currency reserves surpassed US$1.5 trillion, overtaking Japan to become the largest in the world; 
they increased to about US$3.2 trillion as of June 2011 with a large fraction invested in U.S. dollar 
denominated assets such as T-bills and notes.
2  The rapid increase in China’s foreign exchange 
reserves suggests that there is a large amount of speculative, “hot” money in China in anticipation of 
a continuing appreciation of the RMB, China’s currency, relative to all other major currencies, 
especially the US dollar.  Depending on how the government and the central bank handle the process 
of revaluation, especially when there is a large amount of capital outflow, there could be a classic 
currency crisis as the government and central bank try to defend the partial currency peg, which in 
turn may trigger a banking crisis if there are large withdrawals from banks.   
The remaining sections are organized as follows.  In Section II, we briefly review the history 
of China’s financial system development, present aggregate evidence on China’s financial system, 
and compare them to those of developed and other developing countries.  In Section III, we examine 
China’s banking system and changes over time.  In Section IV, we briefly examine the growth and 
irregularities of financial markets, including the stock market, real estate market, and listed firms, and 
consider the effects of several initiatives to develop new markets and further develop existing 
markets, as well as changes in corporate governance among listed firms.  In Section V, we examine 
the non-standard financial sector, including alternative financial channels and governance 
mechanisms.  Motivated by the success of this financial sector and firms in the Hybrid Sector, we 
also compare the advantages and disadvantages of using the law as the basis of finance and 
commerce.  We then examine different types of financial crises and their potential effects on China’s 
financial system in Section VI.  Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.  In terms of converting 
RMB into US dollar, we use the exchange rate of US$1 = RMB 8.28 (yuan) for transactions and 
events occurring before 2005, and the spot rate at the end of each year for those activities during and 
after 2005 (Figure 8-B provides a graph of the exchange rates between the US dollar and the RMB). 
 
II. Overview of China’s Financial System   
II.1  A Brief Review of the History of China’s Financial System 
  China’s financial system was well developed before 1949.
3  One key finding in reviewing the 
                                                           
2 According to the U.S. Treasury Department, China’s holding of U.S. treasury securities reached $ 1.17 trillion in July 
2011. Morrison and Labonte (2008) estimate that around 70% of China’s foreign reserves are invested in dollar 
denominated assets. 
3 For more descriptions of the pre-1949 history of China’s financial system, see AQQ (2008); for more anecdotal 
evidence on China’s financial system in the same period, see, for example, Kirby (1995) and Lee (1993).    5 
history of this period, including the rise of Shanghai as one of the financial centers of Asia during the 
first half of the 20
th Century, is that the development of China’s commerce and financial system as a 
whole was by and large outside the formal legal system.  For example, despite the entrance of 
Western-style courts in Shanghai and other major coastal cities in the early 1900s, most business-
related disputes were resolved through mechanisms outside courts, including guilds (merchant 
coalitions), families and local notables.
4  In Section V.3 below, we argue that modern equivalents of 
these nonlegal dispute-resolution and corporate governance mechanisms are behind the success of 
Hybrid Sector firms in the same areas in the 1980s and 1990s, and that these alternative mechanisms 
may be more responsive in adapting to changes in a fast-growing economy like China than the law 
and legal institutions. 
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, all of the pre-1949 capitalist 
companies and institutions were nationalized by 1950.  Between 1950 and 1978, China’s financial 
system consisted of a single bank − the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), a central government 
owned and controlled bank under the Ministry of Finance, which served as both the central bank and 
a commercial bank, controlling about 93% of the total financial assets of the country and handling 
almost all financial transactions.  With its main role to finance the physical production plans, the 
PBOC used both a “cash-plan” and a “credit-plan” to control the cash flows in consumer markets and 
transfer flows between branches.   
  The first main structural change began in 1978 and ended in 1984.  By the end of 1979, the 
PBOC departed the Ministry and became a separate entity, while three state-owned banks took over 
some of its commercial banking businesses: The Bank of China
5 (BOC) was given the mandate to 
specialize in transactions related to foreign trade and investment; the People’s Construction Bank of 
China (PCBC), originally formed in 1954, was set up to handle transactions related to fixed 
investment (especially in manufacturing); the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) was set up (in 1979) 
to deal with all banking business in rural areas; and, the PBOC was formally established as China’s 
central bank and a two-tier banking system was formed.  Finally, the fourth state-owned commercial 
bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was formed in 1984, and took over the 
rest of the commercial transactions of the PBOC. 
                                                           
4 See, e.g., Chung (2005), for descriptions on family- and community-based mechanisms for contract enforcement.  
Looking at how disputes were resolved in and outside courts, Goetzmann and Köll (2005) conclude that the passing of 
China’s first Company law in 1904, which was intended to provide a better legal environment for business and 
commerce, did not lead to actual changes in corporate governance and better protection of (minority) shareholder rights. 
5 BOC, among the oldest banks currently in operation, was originally established in 1912 as a private bank, and 
specialized in foreign currency related transactions.    6 
For most of the 1980s, the development of the financial system can be characterized by the 
fast growth of financial intermediaries outside of the “Big Four” banks.  Regional banks (partially 
owned by local governments) were formed in the Special Economic Zones in the coastal areas; in 
rural areas, a network of Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs; similar to credit unions in the U.S.) was 
set up under the supervision of the ABC, while Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs), counterparts of 
the RCCs in the urban areas, were also founded.  Non-bank financial intermediaries, such as the Trust 
and Investment Corporations (TICs; operating in selected banking and non-banking services with 
restrictions on both deposits and loans), emerged and proliferated in this period.  
The most significant event for China’s financial system in the 1990s was the inception and 
growth of China’s stock market.  Two domestic stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) were established 
in 1990 and grew very fast during most of the 1990s and in recent years in terms of the total market 
capitalization and trading volume.  In parallel with the development of the stock market, the real 
estate market also went from nonexistent in the early 1990s to one that is currently comparable in size 
with the stock market.
6  Both the stock and real estate markets have experienced major corrections 
during the past decade, and are characterized by high volatilities and speculative short-term behaviors 
by many investors.   
These patterns are in part due to the fact that the development of a supportive legal framework 
and institutions has been lagging behind that of the markets.  For example, China’s first bankruptcy 
law (governing SOEs) was passed in 1986 on a trial basis, but the formal Company Law did not 
become effective until the end of 1999.  This version of the Company Law governs all corporations 
with limited liability, publicly listed and traded companies, and branches or divisions of foreign 
companies, as well as their organization structure, securities issuance and trading, accounting, 
bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions (for details see the website of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/).  In August 2006, a new bankruptcy law was enacted, 
and it became effective June 1, 2007.  We provide a brief analysis of the status and problems of the 
stock market and real estate market in Section IV below.  
  Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, financial sector reform has focused on state-
owned banks and especially the problem of NPLs (the China Banking Regulation Committee  
(CBRC) was also established to oversee the banking industry).  We will further discuss this issue in 
Section III.  China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001 marked the beginning of a new era, as we 
continue to observe increasing competition from foreign financial institutions and more frequent and 
                                                           
6 At the end of 2007, the total market capitalization of the two domestic exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) was around $1.8 
trillion, whereas total investment in the real estate market was around $3.12 trillion.   7 
larger scale capital flows.  While increasingly larger inflows of foreign capital and the presence of 
foreign institutions may continue to drive further growth of the financial system and economy, larger 
scale capital flows can also increase the likelihood of damaging financial crises.  We will discuss 
these issues in Sections IV and VI.    
A developed financial system is characterized by, among other factors, the substantial role 
played by institutional investors.  In China, institutional investors began to emerge in the late 1990s: 
the first closed-end fund, in which investors cannot withdraw capital after initial investment, was set 
up in 1997, and the first open-end fund, in which investors can freely withdraw capital (subject to 
share redemption restrictions), was established in 2001.  By November 2009, there were 65 fund 
companies managing 551 funds with 520 open-ended funds and the rest close-ended.  The total net 
assets value (NAV) increased from RMB11 billion (or US$ 1.3 Billion) in 1998 to RMB 2.26 trillion 
(or $328 billion) in November 2009, which is still small compared to the assets within the banking 
sector.  In 2003, a few Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) entered China’s asset 
management industry, and they have been operating through forming joint ventures with Chinese 
companies.  On the other hand, China allowed Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) to 
invest in overseas markets beginning in July 2006.  At the end of 2008, the ten QDII funds had a total 
of $109.4 billion assets under management.   
At the national level, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established in September 
2007 with the intent of utilizing the accumulated foreign reserves for the benefit of the state and 
$207.91 billion foreign reserves were placed under management at the establishment.  CIC makes 
occasional announcements about its investment, but the overall transparency of its investment 
strategy is low.  Since inception, CIC has made some aggressive investment decisions, including the 
well publicized $3 billion (pre-IPO) investment in private equity group Blackstone, and the $5 billion 
investment in Morgan Stanley (this took the form of mandatory convertible bonds that can be 
converted into almost 10% of the firm’s equity).  
 Endowed with limited capital and given problems with the administration of the pension 
system, pension funds have not played a significant role in the stock or bond market.
7  With a fast 
aging population and the growth of households’ disposable income, further development of a multi-
pillar pension system, including individual accounts with employees’ self-contributed (tax exempt) 
                                                           
7 While there is a nationwide, government run pension system (financed mainly through taxes on employers and 
employees), the coverage ratio of the pension system varies significantly across regions and is particularly low in rural 
areas.  Moreover, there is a very limited amount of capital in individual accounts and most of the capital has been invested 
in banks and government projects with low returns. See, for example, Feldstein (1999, 2003) and Feldstein and Liebman 
(2006), for more details on China’s pension system.    8 
funds that can be directly invested in the financial markets, can lead to the development of both the 
financial system and the fiscal system as well as social stability.  At the top of the pension fund 
system, China’s National Social Security Fund (NSSF) was established in August 2002 and is 
administered by the National Council for Social Security Fund.  This (sovereign) fund is mainly 
financed by capital and equity assets derived from the listing of state-owned companies, fiscal 
allocations from the central government, and other investment proceeds.  It has recently shifted its 
core investment strategy of focusing on the domestic A-share and bond markets to a more diversified 
basket of assets, including investments in emerging markets and Europe.  At the end of 2008, the 
fund had a total of $89.2 billion in assets; it grew to RMB856.7 billion ($142.8 billion) at the end of 
2010 according to the annual report of NSSF.  Finally, there are very few hedge funds that implement 
“long-short” strategies, as short selling has been prohibited until recently.
8  
Insert Figure 1 here. 
  Figure 1 depicts the current structure of the entire financial system.  In what follows we will 
describe and examine each of the major sectors of the financial system.  In addition to the standard 
sectors of banking and intermediation and financial markets, we will document the importance of the 
non-standard financial sector.  Due to space limitation, we do not cover China’s “foreign sectors” in 
this chapter; for discussions on the history and the role of these sectors in supporting the growth of 
the economy, see, for example, Prasad and Wei (2005) for a review. 
 
II.2 Size and Efficiency of the Financial System: Banks, Markets, and Alternative Finance 
In Table 1, we compare China’s financial system to those of other major emerging economies, 
with measures for the size and efficiency of banks and markets taken from Levine (2002) and 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) and data from the World Bank Financial Database.  We present 
average figures over the period 2001-2007 for each country as well as the average of all the other 
emerging economies (excluding China).  We first compare the size of a country’s banks and equity 
markets relative to that country’s gross domestic product (GDP).  In terms of total market 
capitalization, China’s stock market, at 64% of its GDP over the period 2001-2007, is slightly larger 
than the 58% of GDP average of the other major emerging economies.  “Value Traded” is perhaps a 
better measure of the actual size of the market than “market capitalization,” because the latter 
includes non-tradable shares or tradable shares that are rarely traded.  In this regard, the size of 
                                                           
8 Along with the introduction of an index future (for A shares) in April 2010, a trial program on short selling began for 
selected institutional investors (security companies; see, e.g., www.wsj.com, 3/31/2010). The impact of introducing these 
new programs and products on the financial market is yet to be seen.   9 
China’s stock market (62% of GDP) is significantly larger than the average of other emerging 
economies (with an average of 37% of GDP).  Similarly, the size of China’s banking system, in terms 
of total bank credit to non-state sectors, is 116% of its GDP over 2001-2007, and considerably larger 
than the average of other major emerging economies (with an average of 65% of GDP).  However, 
the majority of the bank credit goes to state-owned firms in China and only a small fraction goes to 
firms in the Hybrid Sector (more evidence of this is given below).  In addition, NPLs account for a 
larger fraction of all the loans in China than the average of other emerging economies (16% vs. 10%), 
indicating that its banking sector still has scope to improve its efficiency.
9  
Insert Table 1 here. 
 The next two columns of Table 1 (“Structure indices”) compare the relative importance of 
financial markets vs. banks, with a lower score indicating that banks are more important relative to 
markets.  China’s score for “Structure size” (Log of the ratio of Market Capitalization/Total Bank 
Credit) is positive, suggesting that the size of total market capitalization is actually larger than that of 
bank credit, and the score is greater than the average of other emerging economies; its score for 
“Structure Activity” (Log of the ratio of Float supply of market cap/Total Bank Credit) is negative, 
indicating that float supply fraction of the market cap is still smaller than bank credit, and it is similar 
to the average of other emerging economies.  Taken together these numbers suggest that the financial 
system of most emerging economies, including that of China, remains bank-dominated.  In terms of 
“Structure efficiency” (Log of product (Market capitalization/GDP) × (bank NPLs/bank total loans)), 
which denotes the relative efficiency of markets vs. banks, China has a higher score than most other 
developing countries, suggesting that its banks are relatively less efficient than markets compared to 
other countries.  “Structure regulatory” measures (based on 2005 data) the extent to which 
commercial banks are restricted to participate in activities outside commercial lending, and China’s 
score of 16 is higher than most other countries, suggesting that by law commercial banks in China 
face tight restrictions in operating in other areas. 
We also compare the development of the financial system (“Financial Development”), 
including both banks and markets (the last three columns of Table 1).  China’s overall financial 
market size, in terms of both “Finance Activity” (Log of product of (Float supply of market/GDP) × 
(Bank credit/GDP)) and “Finance Size” (Log of product of (Market capitalization/GDP) + (Bank 
                                                           
9 Levine (2002) uses bank overhead cost/total assets to measure banking sector efficiency, and used this measure to 
construct the “Structure Efficiency” and “Finance Efficiency” measures. However, the World Bank Financial Database no 
longer reports the overhead cost/assets ratio; we replace this with NPLs/loans ratio as an alternative measure of efficiency 
and use this variable to define other efficiency measures in Table 1.     10
credit/GDP)), are larger than the averages of other emerging countries.  In terms of “Finance 
Efficiency” (Log of (Total floating supply/GDP)/Bank NPLs Ratio), China’s measure is slightly 
higher than the average of other emerging countries.  Based on the evidence from the past decade, we 
can conclude that China’s banks and markets, or the formal sectors of the financial system, are as 
large as or larger than other major emerging economies (relative to its size of the economy).  
However, the banking sector does not lend much to the Hybrid Sector, which as we will see in 
Section V, is the dynamic part of the economy. 
A related question to the size of banks and markets is where do most firms get the capital and 
funds?  As shown in AQQ (2005, 2008), the four most important financing sources for all firms in 
China, in terms of firms’ fixed asset investments, are, (domestic) bank loans, firms’ self-fundraising, 
the state budget and FDI, with self-fundraising and bank loans carrying most of the weight.  Self-
fundraising, falling into the category of alternative finance (non-bank, non-market finance), includes 
proceeds from capital raised from local governments (beyond the state budget), communities and 
other investors, internal financing channels such as retained earnings and all other funds raised 
domestically by the firms.  The size of total self-fundraising of all firms has been growing at an 
average annual rate of 23.6% over the period of 1994-2009, and reached $2,213.2 billion at the end of 
2009, compared to a total of $565.7 billion for domestic bank loans for the same year. It is important 
to point out that equity and bond issuance, which are included in self-fundraising (but fall into the 
category of formal external finance), apply only to the Listed Sector, and account for a small fraction 
of this category.   
While the Listed Sector has been growing fast, SOEs are on a downward trend, as 
privatization of these firms is still in progress.  Around 30% of publicly traded companies’ funding 
comes from bank loans, and this ratio has been very stable.  Around 45% of the Listed Sector’s total 
funding comes from self-fundraising, including internal financing and proceeds from equity and bond 
issuance.  Moreover, equity and bond sales, which rely on the use of external markets, only constitute 
a small fraction of total funds raised in comparison to internal financing and other forms of 
fundraising.  Combined with the fact that self-fundraising is also the most important source of 
financing for the State Sector (45% to 65%), we can conclude that alternative channels of financing 
are important even for the State and Listed Sectors. 
Not surprisingly, self-fundraising plays an even more important role for firms in the Hybrid 
Sector, accounting for close to 60% of total funds raised, while individually owned companies, a 
subset of the Hybrid Sector, rely on self-fundraising for 90% of total financing.  Self-fundraising here   11
includes all forms of internal finance, capital raised from family and friends of the founders and 
managers, and funds raised in the form of private equity and loans.  Since firms in this sector operate 
in an environment with legal and financial mechanisms and regulations that are probably poorer than 
those available for firms in the State and Listed Sectors, financing sources may work differently from 
how they work in the State and Listed Sectors, and those in developed countries.  In Allen, 
Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (ACDQQ, 2008), the authors argue that alternative finance channels, 
substitute for formal financing channels through banks and markets, and expand the capacity of 
financial systems in emerging countries such as China and India. 
 
III. The Banking and Intermediation Sector 
  In this section, we examine the status of China’s banking and intermediation sector.  After 
reviewing aggregate evidence on bank deposits and loans, we analyze the size and time trend of 
NPLs.  Finally, we review evidence on the growth of non-state banks and financial intermediaries. 
III.1 Aggregate Evidence on Bank Deposits and Loans 
  As in other Asian countries, China’s household savings rates have been high throughout the 
reform era.  Given the growth of the economy, the sharp increase in personal income, and limited 
investment opportunities, it is not surprising that total bank deposits from individuals have been 
growing fast since the mid-1980s.  From Figure 2-A, residents in metropolitan areas contribute the 
most to total deposits beginning in the late 1980s (roughly 50%), while deposits from enterprises 
(including firms from all three sectors) provide the second most important source.  The role of 
deposits from government agencies and organizations (including non-profit and for-profit 
organizations, not shown in the figure) has steadily decreased over time.  
Insert Tables 2-A, 2-B, and Figures 2-A and 2-B here. 
  Table 2-A compares total savings and bank deposits in China, Japan, South Korea, and India 
during the period 1997-2009.  In terms of the ratio of Time and Savings Deposits/GDP, China 
maintains the highest or second highest level (an average of over 90% in recent years), while Japan 
leads the group in terms of total amount.  Looking at the breakdown of bank deposits, interest-
bearing “savings deposits” are by far the most important form of deposits in China, providing a good 
source for bank loans and other forms of investment.  Figure 2-B compares total (nonstate) bank 
credit (over GDP) extended to Hybrid Sector firms in China, and privately owned firms (including 
those publicly listed and traded) in Taiwan and South Korea.  For South Korea, we also plot the bank 
credit ratios during its high economic growth period of the 1970s and 1980s (each year appearing on   12
the horizontal axis indicates the time period for China, while a particular year minus 20 indicates the 
time period for South Korea).  We can see that the scale and growth of China’s ‘hybrid’ bank credit 
during 1991-2009 are far below those (of private bank credit) of Taiwan and South Korea in the same 
period, but are similar to those of South Korea twenty years ago.   
Table 2-B breaks down China’s bank loans by maturities, loan purposes, and borrower types 
during the period 1994-2009.  While there has been a shift from short-term to long-term loans (first 
two columns), the majority of loans goes to SOEs in manufacturing industries (“Industrial Loans” 
and “Commercial Loans”).  Most of the “Infrastructure/Construction Loans” (a small component of 
total loans) fund government sponsored projects, while the size of “Agricultural Loans” is much 
smaller.  More importantly, the size of loans made to TVEs, privately- and collectively-owned firms, 
and joint ventures (last 3 columns), which all belong to the Hybrid Sector, is also much smaller.  
Consistent with the aggregate evidence from Section II above and our firm-level evidence below, we 
find that bank loans have been one of the important financing sources for Hybrid Sector firms, but the 
majority of the bank loans goes to the State and Listed Sectors.  Researchers have argued that the 
imbalance between loans made to the State Sector and the Hybrid Sector reflects the government’s 
policies of wealth transfer from the Hybrid Sector to the State Sector via state-owned banks (e.g., 
Brandt and Zhu, 2000).  
 
III.2 An Analysis of NPLs and Further Reform of the Banking Sector   
China’s banking sector is dominated by large state-owned banks, namely, the “Big Four” 
banks of ICBC, BOC, PCBC, and ABC.  The dominance of the Big Four banks also implies that the 
degree of competition within the banking sector has been low.  For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) compare the five-bank concentration (share of the assets of the five largest banks in 
total banking assets), and find that China’s concentration ratio of 91% at the end of 1997 (and for 
much of 1990s) is one of the highest in the world.  However, China’s concentration ratio has been 
falling sharply since 1997 with the entrance of many non-state banks and intermediaries.  
The most significant problem for China’s banking sector, and for the entire financial system 
during the last decade, was the amount of NPLs within state-owned banks, and in particular, among 
the Big Four banks.  Reducing the amount of NPLs to normal levels was a high priority for China’s 
financial system.  We mainly rely on official sources for our analysis on NPLs, but we also speculate 
based on data from non-government sources, including case studies from particular regions or banks.    13
Some of this data and speculations paint a much gloomier picture of the NPLs and China’s state-
owned banks than the official data suggests.     
Comparing NPLs and Reducing NPLs in China 
In Panel A of Table 3-A, we compare NPLs in China, the U.S., and other major Asian 
economies during 1998-2010 based on official figures.  NPLs are measured by their size (in US$ 
billion) and as a percentage of GDP in the same year (shown in brackets).  Notice that the official 
information on China’s NPLs first became available in 1998, but the figures in 1998 and 1999 in 
Table 3-A probably significantly under-estimate the actual size of NPLs; this also explains the jump 
in the size of China’s NPLs from 1999 to 2000.  China’s NPLs are the highest in the group from 2000 
to 2007, and as high as 20% to 22.5% of GDP (in 2000 and 2001).  The cross-country comparison 
includes the period during which Asian countries recovered from the 1997 financial crisis (e.g., the 
size of NPLs in South Korea exceeded 12% of GDP in 1999 but it was reduced to below 3% two 
years later), and the period during which the Japanese banking system was disturbed by the 
prolonged NPL problem (the size of Japan’s NPLs is the second largest of the group throughout the 
period).  However, the level of NPLs (over GDP) in China has shown a clear downward trend since 
the peak in 2000-2001, with the total amount of NPLs also falling during 2004-2010.  In fact, with 
the banking sector in most developed countries struggling with the ongoing global financial crisis, 
China’s banking sector has done quite well, with its total NPLs in 2010 ($68.1 billion) only one 
seventh of that of the U.S. and the ratio of NPLs over GDP falling below that of the U.S. as well.  
Insert Table 3-A here. 
As bad as some of the NPL numbers in early years in Panel A of Table 3-A appear, they may 
still significantly underestimate the amount of NPLs within China’s banking system according to 
some critics.  First, the official figures on outstanding NPLs (cumulated across all commercial banks 
in China) do not include the bad loans that have been transferred from banks to four state-owned 
asset management companies (AMCs)—with the purpose of liquidating these bad loans.  For 
example, if we add the NPLs held by the four AMCs (book value of RMB 866 billion, or $125.5 
billion, shown in the last row of Table 3-B) in the first quarter of 2006 to the mix of NPLs shown in 
Panel A of Table 3-A, the total amount of China’s NPLs would increase by two-thirds.  Second, the 
classification of NPLs has been problematic in China.  The Basle Committee for Bank Supervision 
classifies a loan as “doubtful” or bad when any interest payment is overdue by 180 days or more (in 
the U.S. it is 90 days); whereas in China, this step has not typically been taken until the principal 
payment is delayed beyond the loan maturity date or an extended due date, and in many cases, until   14
the borrower has declared bankruptcy and/or has gone through liquidation.  Qiu et al. (2000) estimate 
that the ratio of loan interest paid to state-owned banks over loan interest owed is on average less 
than 50% in 1999, suggesting that the actual ratio of NPLs over total loans made can be higher than 
50% in 1999.  This piece of evidence, along with others, suggests that the amount of NPLs (and as a 
percentage of GDP) could be twice as large as the official figures reported in Panel A of Table 3-A.
10  
Since a large fraction of the NPLs among state-owned banks, and in particular, the Big Four 
banks, resulted from poor lending decisions made for SOEs, some of which were due to political or 
other non-economic reasons, it can be argued that the natural party to bear the burden of reducing the 
NPLs is the government.  This view of essentially treating NPLs as a fiscal problem implies that the 
ultimate source of eliminating NPLs lies in China’s overall economic growth.
11  As long as the 
economy maintains its strong growth momentum so that tax receipts also increase, the government 
can always assume the remaining (and new) NPLs without significantly affecting the economy.  In 
this regard, Panel B of Table 3-A compares total outstanding government debt, and Panel C presents 
a comparison of the ratio of (NPLs + Government Debt)/GDP across countries, with the sum of NPLs 
and government debt indicating the total burden of the government.  Depending on data availability, 
total government debt is either measured by the sum of all types of domestic and foreign debt (the 
U.S., Japan, and India), or by the level of outstanding government bonds (all other countries) in a 
given year.   
Unlike the severity of its NPL problem in the early 2000s, the Chinese government has not 
issued a large amount of debt, with total outstanding government bonds growing from only 9% of 
GDP in 1998 to around 20% of GDP in 2010.  By contrast, countries such as the U.S. and India have 
a large amount of government debt.  Japan is the only country in the group that has a large amount of 
NPLs and government debt for most of the period.  When we combine the results from Panels A and 
B and compare the total government burden in Panel C, we use two sets of ratios for U.S. and Japan.  
In addition to using total outstanding government debt, we use ratios (in the brackets) based on the 
sum of net government debt and NPLs, where net government debt is the difference between 
government borrowing (a ‘stock’ measure) and government lending (also a stock measure); not 
surprisingly, these ratios are much lower than using the gross figures. 
From Panel C, China’s total government burden is in the middle of the pack: the ratios of total 
                                                           
10 Consistent with this view, Lardy (1998) argues that, if using international standards on bad loans, the existing NPLs 
within China’s state-owned banks as of the mid-1990s would make these banks’ total net worth negative, so that the 
entire network of state banks would have been insolvent. 
11 See, for example, Perkins and Rawski (2008) for a review and projections on the prospects of long-run economic 
growth and statistics in China.   15
government burden over GDP (using the official NPL figures) are significantly lower than those in 
Japan, the U.S., and India, are comparable with those of Taiwan and Korea, and are higher than 
Indonesia only.  In recent years, even if we double the size of the official NPL figures, China’s total 
government burden would not increase much as the total amount of NPLs is small relative to the size 
of GDPs.  Based on these crude comparisons, going forward it seems that the NPLs should not be an 
arduous burden for the Chinese government (or the banking sector), while the same cannot be said for 
Japan and the U.S.  Caution is needed for this conclusion: first, new NPLs in China may grow much 
faster than other countries as the government’s recent massive economic stimulus plan led to a 
significant increase in new loans made during 2008-2009, including many questionable loans to local 
governments
12; and second, China’s currently small government debt may experience a sharp 
increase in the near future given the need for higher fiscal spending in areas such as pension plans 
and other social welfare programs. 
Recognizing the importance of and its responsibility in reducing NPLs in the Big Four banks, 
the Chinese government injected large amounts of foreign currency reserves (mostly in the form of 
US dollars, T-bills, Euros and Yen) into these banks to improve their balance sheets in preparation 
for going public.  This process began at the end of 2003, with the establishment of the Central Huijin 
Investment Company, through which the PBOC injected US$45 billion of reserves into the BOC and 
PCBC, while ICBC (the largest commercial bank in China and one of the largest in the world in 
terms of assets) received US$15 billion during the first half of 2005.  In 2008, ABC received US$19 
billion from Huijin in spite of the global financial crisis.  All Big Four banks have since become 
publicly listed and traded on either the HKSE and/or the SHSE, including ABC (the last of the Big 
Four), which completed its IPO on July 15, 2010 (SHSE) and July 16 (HKSE).  
However, the injection plan will not prevent new NPLs from originating in the banking 
system.  In fact, it may create perverse “too big to fail” incentives for state-owned banks, in that if 
these banks believe that there will be a ‘bailout’ whenever they run into future financial distress, they 
have an incentive to take on risky, negative-NPV projects. This moral hazard problem can thwart the 
government’s efforts in keeping the NPLs in check, while similar problems occurred during and after 
the government bailouts in the S&L crisis in the U.S. in the 1980s (e.g., Kane 1989, 2003) and are 
among the most significant factors that caused the ongoing financial crisis.  In this regard, a credible 
                                                           
12 According to senior officials from the CBRC, Chinese banks are facing default risks on more than one-fifth of the 
RMB7,700bn ($1,135bn) loans they have made to local governments across the country; most of these loans were used to 
fund regional infrastructure projects (Financial Times, 08/01/2010). In July 2011, Moody estimated that local government 
loans can be as high as RMB14.2 trillion, and the NPL ratio for Chinese banks could be 8-12% (Reuters, 07/05/2011).      16
commitment from the government that the capital injection plan is a one-time measure to boost the 
capital adequacy of these banks, and that there will be no (similar) injection plans in the future can 
help alleviate the moral hazard problem.   
  Another measure taken by the Chinese government to reduce the NPLs is the establishment of 
four state-owned AMCs.  As discussed earlier, the goal of the AMCs is to assume the NPLs (and 
offering debt-for-equity swaps to the banks
13) accumulated in each of the Big Four banks and 
liquidate them.  The liquidation process includes asset sales, tranching, securitization, and resale of 
loans to investors.
14  Table 3-B shows that cash recovery on the bad loans processed by the AMCs 
ranges from 6.9% to 35% between 2001 and 2006 (first quarter)
15, while the asset recovery rates are 
slightly higher.  A critical issue that affects the effectiveness of the liquidation process is the 
relationship among AMCs, banks, and distressed or bankrupt firms.  Since both the AMCs and the 
banks are state-owned, it is not likely that the AMCs would force the banks to cut off (credit) ties 
with defaulted borrowers (SOEs or former SOEs) as a privately owned bank would do.  Thus, as the 
old NPLs are liquidated, new NPLs from the same borrowers continue to surface. 
To summarize, NPLs have been considerably reduced in recent years.  If the economy can 
maintain its current pace of growth, the government can always write off a large fraction of the rest 
(and newly accumulated) of the NPLs to avert any serious problems for China.  Again, caution is in 
place for this optimistic outlook.  One can argue that NPLs are bigger than the official statistics 
suggest to begin with, and that a substantial amount of new NPLs will continue to arise within state-
owned banks.  If the growth of the economy significantly slows down, while the accumulation of 
NPLs continues, the banking sector problems could lead to a financial crisis.  This could spill over 
into other sectors of the economy and cause a slowdown in growth or a recession.   
Insert Tables 3-B and 4-A here. 
The Efficiency of State-owned Banks  
As discussed above, the size of NPLs in the banking sector critically depends on the 
efficiency of banks.  We briefly discuss measures that have been taken to improve the efficiency of 
state-owned banks.  First, state-owned banks have diversified and improved their loan structure by 
                                                           
13 One example is Cinda Asset Management Corporation, which was set up in April, 1999, with a registered capital of 
RMB 10 billion provided by the Ministry of Finance. It took over RMB 220 billion NPLs from the China Construction 
Bank and funded its purchase via bond issues. 
14 The sale of tranches of securitized NPLs to foreign investors began in 2002. The deal was struck between Huarong , 
one of the four AMCs, and a consortium of U.S. investment banks led by Morgan Stanley (and including Lehman 
Brothers and Salomon Smith Barney) and was approved by the government in early 2003 (Financial Times, 05/2003).  
15 The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), from which we obtained data (for 2004-2009), stopped reporting 
data on NPLs from AMCs.   17
increasing consumer-related loans while being more active in risk management and monitoring of 
loans made to SOEs.  For example, the ratio of consumer lending to total loans outstanding made 
from all banks increased from 1% in 1998 to 12% in 2008; by the third quarter of 2009, RMB 4.99 
trillion (or $730.4 billion) of outstanding bank loans were extended to consumers.  The size of 
housing mortgages, now the largest component (87% as in the third quarter of 2009) of consumer 
credit, grew more than 200 times between 1997 and 2008, reaching a total of RMB 4.35 trillion 
($637.2 billion), although the speed of growth has slowed down in 2011, according to the China 
Quarterly Monetary Policy Report of the PBOC.  One problem with the massive expansion of 
consumer credit is that China lacks a national consumer-credit database to spot overstretching 
debtors, although a pilot system linking seven cities was set up in late 2004.  The deficiency in the 
knowledge and training of credit risk and diligence of loan officers from state-owned banks is another 
significant factor in credit expansion, which can lead to high default rates and a large amount of new 
NPLs if the growth of the economy and personal income slows down.   
Accompanying the rapidly expanding automobile industry, the other fast growing category of 
individual-based loans is automobile loans, most of which are made by state-owned banks.  The total 
balance of all China’s individual auto loans increased from RMB 400 million ($50 million) in 1998 
to RMB 200 billion ($25 billion) at the end of 2003, and as much as 30% of all auto sales were 
financed by loans during this period (Financial Times, 05/25/2005).  The growth in both auto sales 
and loans slowed down significantly since 2004 in part due to the high default rates.  In 2008, 
outstanding auto loans decreased to RMB 158.3 billion ($23 billion).  Only 8% of the auto sales were 
financed by loans during that year.  Shanghai and Beijing have the largest number of car sales and 
loans.  As many as 50% of debtors defaulted on their car loans in these cities.  There are examples in 
which loan applications were approved based solely on the applicants’ description of their personal 
income without any auditing (Barron’s, 12/06/2004).  However, the slowdown of the auto loan 
market was temporary and it quickly resumed its fast pace of growth, mainly driven by tremendous 
demand—China has recently overtaken the U.S. to become the largest auto market in the world.  In 
aggregate auto loans amount to 10%-20% of the total amount spent on autos.  Most loans mature in 
three to five years.
16       
  Second, the ongoing privatization process, including the listing of state-owned banks, is also 
an effective channel for enhancing efficiency.  As state ownerships stakes shrink, these banks can 
focus more on for-profit goals, and, with more non-state owners entering the mix the strengthening of 
                                                           
16 A few foreign lenders (e.g., GM and Ford) were approved to enter China’s auto loan market by forming joint ventures 
with Chinese automakers (Financial Times, 05/27/2005).    18
corporate governance to ensure profit-maximizing is the next step.  Panel A of Table 4-A presents the 
performance of IPOs of the Big Four banks (ABC remains in the State Sector) and that of the Bank of 
Communications (BComm).  A notable case is the IPO of ICBC (see Allen, Qian, Shan and Zhao, 
2012 for more details).  Simultaneously carried out in the HKSE and SHSE on October 27, 2006, 
ICBC raised US$21.9 billion, making it the largest IPO (up to that date).  The first day (and first 
week cumulative) return, measured by the net percentage return of the closing price on the first (fifth) 
trading day over offer price, was almost 15%, suggesting high demand for ICBC’s H shares among 
(foreign) investors.  In terms of ownership structure, the state, through various agencies, is by far the 
largest shareholder, with only 22% of the market cap is ‘free float’ or tradable.  The largest foreign 
shareholder is Goldman Sachs with its 5.8% ownership stake negotiated before the IPO.  The recent 
IPO of ABC also attracted a lot of attention.  The total proceeds from its IPO from HKSE (July 16, 
2010) and SHSE (July 15, 2010) reached $22.1 billion, overtaking the ICBC IPO as the world’s 
largest IPO (Associated Press, 08/16/2010).
17  In particular, foreign investors, including institutional 
investors and wealthy families, contributed over 40% of the $12 billion raised from H shares (in the 
HKSE).
18  While the first-week stock performance in the two markets was not as impressive as that 
of ICBC, the fact that the IPO was carried out successfully during the recovery period following one 
of the worst global financial crises is evidence that investors from around the globe have confidence 
in ABC’s role as a leading institution in the world.   
The IPOs of the other three large state-owned banks were also successful in terms of total 
proceeds raised, and they all attracted significant foreign ownership at the IPO date as well.  In fact, 
as shown in Panel B of Table 4-A, four of the 10 largest banks in the world, measured in market 
capitalization as of July 2010, are Chinese banks, with ICBC leading the chart and the newly listed 
ABC making it into the chart too.  In terms of (book) assets, ICBC is the eleventh largest bank in the 
world (Panel C); however, given the accounting problems of evaluating troubled assets related to 
subprime loans and sovereign debt in troubled Euro Zone countries, it is possible that ICBC’s assets, 
with virtually no exposure to the U.S. housing markets or European sovereign debt, could be one of 
the largest and highest quality in the world.  Finally, Moody’s current ratings on these publicly listed 
                                                           
17 From Panel A, Table 4A, the total proceeds (in HK$ and RMB) of the ICBC IPO are actually larger than that of ABC’s 
IPO, but given the appreciation of RMB over the period 2006-2010, the proceeds of the ABC IPO are slightly larger 
measured in US$. 
18 Foreign institutional investors include Qatar Investment Authority ($2.8 billion), Kuwait Investment Authority ($800 
million), Britain's Standard Chartered Bank ($500 million), Dutch bank Radobank Nederland ($250 million), Australia's 
Seven Group Holdings Ltd ($250 million) and Singapore's Temasek Holdings ($200 million); source: ABC’s post-IPO 
news report. However, on a global basis, including shares that are distributed to various government agencies prior to the 
IPO, foreign investors only hold 4% of all of ABC’s shares.   19
banks (on both deposits and loans) range from A to Baa (highest rating is Aaa); while S&P rates 
these banks’ outstanding bonds between A and BBB (highest rating is AAA). 
There are two imminent issues with the privatization process.  The first is related to the 
structure of the banking sector, and in particular, whether more competition, including the entrance of 
more non-state (domestic and foreign) banks and intermediaries, is good for improving the efficiency 
of both the Big Four banks and the entire sector.
19  Another issue is the government’s dual role as 
regulator and as majority owner.  These potentially conflicting roles can diminish the effectiveness of 
each of the two roles that the government intends to carry out.  In Section IV below, we  consider 
whether the ongoing process of floating non-tradable government shares in many listed companies 
can be applied to the privatization process of many state-owned banks/institutions.  Only after these 
banks are (majority) owned by non-government entities and individuals can they unconditionally 
implement all profit- and efficiency-enhancing measures.  However, in light of what occurred in the 
developed countries, where excessive risk-taking and poor risk management and governance in a few 
large institutions essentially brought down the entire financial system, the current ownership structure 
of the largest Chinese banks, in which the government retains the majority control, can enhance the 
regulation of large financial institutions and help to prevent banking and financial crisis in China and 
other emerging economies. 
Third, reforming the organization structure of banks and providing more incentives to banks 
and their employees can improve efficiency.  For example, reforms taking place in the mid-1990s 
provided local banks with more autonomous power, and after the 1994 reforms, approved credit 
volume for specialized banks was based on a maximum ratio between loans and deposits instead of 
administrative quota, which provided those banks with greater flexibility to use within-bank transfers 
to adjust fund allocation.
20  The reforms also provide more profit incentives for managers.  The 
evaluation criteria changed from adherence to the national credit plan to “a combination of profits 
made by the bank branch, attention to cost control, investment in fixed capital of the branch, deposit 
increases, and reduction of overdue loans” (Park and Sehrt, 2001). 
A critical aspect of the decentralization process is to provide individuals with more authority 
and responsibilities.  According to a number of theories (e.g., Stein, 2002), these changes improve the 
quality of ‘soft’ information produced by banks, an essential part of the lending process. Under the 
                                                           
19 For example, with a sample of both state- and non-state owned banks, Berger et al. (2006) show that the addition of 
foreign ownership stakes into banks’ ownership structure is associated with a significant improvement of bank efficiency. 
20 These reforms did not liberalize interest rates; the PBOC continues to set the range (upper and lower bounds, or base 
rate and floating range) within which interest rates can be set; relending was also centralized by the PBOC.     20
old regime, decision making of the entire lending process was group-based and no individual loan 
officers were held responsible for poor decisions.  Facing imminent pressure from competitors 
(including foreign banks) following China’s entrance to WTO in 2001, many state-owned banks 
began implementing new lending policies in 2002.  These new policies grant more authority to 
individuals in charge of different steps of making loans and monitoring borrowers and hold them 
responsible (ex post) for poor performance; decisions such as the final approval of loan contracts are 
left to a group of senior employees (through voting).  Using detailed loan-level data from a large 
state-owned bank with branches throughout the country, Qian, Strahan and Yang (2011) find that an 
internal risk assessment measure has a more pronounced effect, relative to publicly available 
information (‘hard’ information), on both pricing (interest rates) and nonpricing terms (loan size) of 
loan contracts after the reform and becomes a better predictor of loan outcomes.  They also show that 
when the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan contract work together for a 
longer period of time, the rating has an incrementally stronger effect on loan contracts. These results 
highlight how organizational structure and incentives can affect the production and quality of soft 
information.  Better information, in turn, expands the supply of credit and improves (lending) 
outcomes.   
One problem that hinders banks’ efforts in improving efficiency is poor and inconsistent 
enforcement of bankruptcy laws and creditor protection.  China’s first bankruptcy law, passed in 
1986, governed only SOEs and had little impact in practice.  The new bankruptcy law, enacted in 
August 2006 and effective on June 1, 2007, applies to all enterprises except partnerships and sole 
proprietorships.  In many aspects the new law resembles bankruptcy laws in developed countries.  
For example, it introduces the bankruptcy administrator, who manages the assets of the debtor after 
the court has accepted the bankruptcy filing.  Moreover, the law states that these administrators 
should be independent professionals, such as those working for law or accounting firms.  Despite all 
the legal procedures specified by the law, enforcement of the law remains weak and inconsistent.  
Many distressed and insolvent firms are kept afloat, and almost all the listed firms that file for 
bankruptcy end up with restructuring plans and these firms are rarely delisted.
21   
A number of reasons can explain the weak enforcement of the bankruptcy law.  There are 
regulations and circulars issued by the central government applicable to SOE bankruptcies that are de 
                                                           
21 According to the National Development and Reform Commission, 67,000 small and mid-sized enterprises were shut 
down in the first half of 2008, but only 2,955 bankruptcy cases were filed nationwide for the same year. When a listed 
firm is in distress (with the “ST” flag), typically other (nonlisted) firms will invest in and restructure the ST firm to avoid 
delisting, since the ‘shell’ of the distressed firm is valuable given the difficult and costly process of IPOs.   21
facto in priority over the Law.  A good example is Doctrine #10 of the State Council, which governs 
the bankruptcy process of SOEs in 111 pilot cities.  This doctrine requires approval from 
secured/senior creditors (e.g., banks) before an enterprise can go through bankruptcy proceedings.  In 
reality, however, the bankruptcy court also requires the consent of local government (Fan et al., 
2008).  Since local governments are usually responsible for the settlement of workers displaced by 
bankrupt firms, it is in their best interest to halt the bankruptcy filing until a satisfactory settlement 
plan is reached.  As a result, mergers and acquisitions with other firms are preferred to bankruptcy, 
and it has been documented that M&As have been indeed used extensively to resolve firms’ distress 
(e.g., Kam et al., 2008), and many bankruptcies cases are postponed or avoided.  In fact, when in 
distress, both the SOEs and local government give the greatest priority to employees; local 
government favors SOEs over banks since SOEs provide more employment opportunities.  
Furthermore, banks are often reluctant to push for bankruptcy since most of the distressed debt would 
be written off; the recovery rate for most bank loans is less than 10% (World Bank, 2001).  Taking 
the defaulted firm to court to recover loans or seize the firm’s assets is a lengthy process and the 
chances of winning are slim; as a result, only a small number of lawsuits involving bankrupt firms 
reach the courts. 
For insolvent SOEs, what triggers the bankruptcy procedure is not their financial status per se, 
but whether they can get preferential treatment from the government.  The average number of 
bankruptcy cases placed on file (by courts) was 277 per year during 1989-1993. This then jumped to 
5,900 per year between 1994 and 2003, after the Capital Structure Optimization Program for 
industrial SOEs was implemented in several pilot cities.
22  The number of cases fell after 2003 partly 
due to the central government’s intention to maintain social stability by controlling the number of 
bankruptcies; the Supreme People’s Court also ruled in 2002 that the courts would not process 
bankruptcy cases if the main intention were to escape debts.  According to the surveys presented by 
Garnaut, Song and Yao (2004), 90% of CEOs of the surveyed SOEs believe that bankruptcy is 
actually a feasible channel to evade bank debts. Since the government’s program provides 
preferential treatments including debt write-offs, many SOEs would wait until they are covered by 
the program before filing for bankruptcy.   
As the most senior creditors (secured debt), banks’ willingness to lend depends on their 
bargaining power and ability to seize collateralized assets upon default, and hence ineffective creditor 
protection not only increases potential losses from bad loans, it also reduces banks’ incentive to 
                                                           
22 In China, a court must accept a case petition before deciding whether it should be declined or placed on file for 
investigation/prosecution; thus the number of cases accepted is always greater than the number of cases placed on file.    22
investigate and monitor borrowers.
23  The favorable treatment SOEs enjoy during distress adversely 
change their incentives in investment and corporate governance, these effects can also spill over into 
banks’ decisions to lend to non-state firms and reduce the credit access of these firms.  Therefore, 
consistent regulation guidelines in dealing with distress and bankruptcy by different types of firms, 
along with the government’s commitment to leave the decision process to professionals and courts, 
can benefit the development of credit markets.  On the other hand, we discuss evidence below that 
informal dispute resolution mechanisms outside the legal system based on reputation and 
relationships has been an effective substitute for Chinese firms and investors. 
 
III.3 Growth of Non-state Financial Intermediaries 
  The development of both non-state banks and other (state and non-state) financial institutions 
will allow China to have a stable and functioning banking system in the future.  In addition to 
boosting the overall efficiency of the banking system, these financial institutions provide funding to 
support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.  
  First, we examine and compare China’s insurance market to other Asian economies (South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore).  In terms of the ratio of total assets managed by insurance companies 
over GDP (Figure 2-C), China’s insurance market is significantly smaller than that of other 
economies.  At the end of 2009 total assets managed are only about 10% of GDP, while this ratio for 
the other three economies is over 30%.  It is clear that the insurance industry is also significantly 
smaller compared to China’s banking industry, and property insurance is particularly underdeveloped 
due to the fact that the private real estate market was only recently established (in the past most 
housing was allocated by employers or the government).  Despite the fast growth of insurance 
coverage and premium income, only 4% of the total population was covered by life insurance.  
Insurance premiums were only 3.2% of GDP in 2008, standing far behind the global average figure 
of over 7%; coverage ratios for property insurance are even lower (according to the reports by 
KPMG).  However, coverage ratios have been growing steadily at an average annual rate of 6% 
between 1998 and 2005 (XinHua News).  In 2008 the insurance industry in China grew at the fastest 
pace (40%) since 2002.  In the first quarter of 2010, China Insurance Regulatory Committee 
announced that China’s insurance premiums totaled RMB 454.14 billion, representing an increase of 
38.6 percent year on year. 
                                                           
23 With a large sample of syndicated loans around the globe, Qian and Strahan (2007) show that strong creditor protection 
(in borrower countries) enhances loan availability as lenders are more willing to provide credit on favorable terms (e.g., 
longer maturities and lower interest rates).   23
Insert Tables 4-B and 4-C, and Figure 2-C here. 
  Table 4-B provides a (partial) breakdown of the different types of banks.  During the period of 
2001-2009, although the largest four or five banks (the fifth largest bank is Bank of Communications, 
also state owned) dominate in every aspect of the banking sector, the role of other banks in the entire 
banking sector cannot be ignored.  As of 2009, other banks (including foreign banks) and credit 
cooperatives’ total assets compose over 70% of the largest five banks (the actual fraction is likely to 
be higher due to incomplete information on all types of deposit-taking institutions); similar 
comparisons can be made for total deposits and outstanding loans.  In addition, these banks and 
institutions appear to have less NPLs than the largest state-owned banks.  Table 4-C provides 
evidence on the growth of non-bank intermediaries.  Overall, the growth of these non-bank 
intermediaries has been impressive since the late 1990s.  Among them, “other commercial banks” 
(many of them are state-owned), RCCs, and TICs hold the largest amount of assets; the size of 
foreign banks and mutual funds (not listed in the table) is minuscule, but these are likely to be the 
focus of development in the near future.
24  Finally, our coverage of non-bank financial institutions 
excludes various forms of informal financial intermediaries, some of which are deemed illegal but 
overall provide a considerable amount of financing to firms in the Hybrid Sector.  
 
IV. Financial Markets 
In this section, we examine China’s financial markets, including both the stock and real estate 
markets, and the recent addition of venture capital and private equity markets as well as asset 
management industries.  We also compare, at the aggregate level, how firms raise funds in China and 
in other emerging economies through external markets in order to determine if China’s experience is 
unique.  We then briefly review publicly traded companies’ financing and investment decisions.  
Finally, we discuss the further development of financial markets as well as corporate governance and 
the performance of listed firms.  
IV.1 Overview of Stock Markets  
After the inception of China’s domestic stock exchanges, the SHSE and SZSE, in 1990, they 
initially grew quickly.  The high growth rates continued through most of the 1990s, and the market 
reached a peak by the end of 2000.  As shown in Figure 3, the momentum of the market, indicated by 
the SSE Index, then reversed during the next five years as it went through a major correction with 
                                                           
24 Postal savings (deposit-taking institutions affiliated with local post offices) is another form of non-bank intermediation 
that is not reported in Table 4-B due to a lack of time series data.  However, at the end of 2008, total deposits within the 
postal savings system exceeded RMB 2079 billion, or 9.5% of all deposits in China.      24
half of the market capitalization lost.  Most of the losses were recovered by the end of 2006, and the 
market reached new heights during 2007.  However, following a string of negative news worldwide 
(culminating with the subprime loans-led global crisis) and domestically (including high levels of 
inflation) the market lost three quarters of its value by the end of 2008.  During the first half of 2009, 
with the impact of the massive stimulus package and rebounding from a trough, China’s stock market 
bounced back and recovered about one third of the losses in 2008.  However the stock market dipped 
again in the first half of 2010, partly due to the concern that the government is taking measures to 
cool down the fast growing housing market.  Figure 3 compares the performance of some of the 
major stock exchanges around the world, as measured by the ‘buy-and-hold’ return in the period 
December 1992 and December 2010 (gross return at December 2010 with $1 invested in each of the 
valued-weighted stock indexes at the end of 1992).  We plot inflation-adjusted real returns.  Over this 
period, the performance of the value-weighted SHSE index (the calculation for the SZSE is very 
similar) is below that of the SENSEX (India), which has the best performance among the group, and 
that of S&P (U.S.), but better than FTSE (London) and the Nikkei Index, the worst among the group.  
Insert Figure 3 and Table 5-A here. 
As Table 5-A indicated, at the end of 2010, the SHSE was ranked the sixth largest market in 
the world in term of market capitalization, while the SZSE was ranked the fourteenth.  The Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), where selected firms from Mainland China have been listed and 
traded, is ranked the seventh largest in the world.  Needless to say, the Chinese financial markets will 
play an increasingly important role in world financial markets.  Also from Table 5-A, 
“Concentration” is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year coming from the 
turnover of the companies with the largest market cap (top 5%), and SHSE (55.8%) is in line with 
that of other large exchanges, indicating that trading is concentrated among large-cap stocks.  
“Turnover velocity” is the (annual) total turnover for all the listed firms expressed as a percentage of 
the total market capitalization, and the figures for SZSE and SHSZ are the highest among the largest 
exchanges, suggesting that there is a large amount of speculative trading especially among small- and 
medium-cap stocks (as these are more easily manipulated than large cap stocks) in the Chinese 
markets. 
There are two other markets established to complement the two main exchanges.  First, a fully 
electronically operated market (“Er Ban Shi Chang” or “Second-tier Market,” similar to the 
NASDAQ) for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was opened in June 2004.  It was designed to 
lower the entry barriers for SME firms, especially newly established firms in the high-tech industries.    25
By the end of February 2007, there are 119 firms listed in this market.  Second, a “third-tier market” 
(“San Ban Shi Chang,” or “Third-tier Market,”) was established to deal primarily with de-listing 
firms and other over-the-Counter (OTC) transactions.  Since 2001, some publicly listed firms on both 
SHSE and SZSE that do not meet the listing standards have been delisted and the trading of their 
shares shifted to this market. On October 23, 2009, China launched a Nasdaq-style Growth 
Enterprises Market (GEM, or “Chuang Ye Ban”) with 28 companies, mainly from hi-tech, electronic 
and pharmaceutical industries.  The main purpose of GEM is to provide financing for small and 
medium sized private enterprises.  The first 10 firms seeking to list on the GEM drew a combined 
RMB 784 billion in subscriptions in September 2009, while the second and third sets had 18 firms, 
including Huayi Brothers Media, China’s largest privately owned film company.  As of October 
2011, no index is available for the GEM but most of the listed stocks have outperformed the indexes 
of the two main exchanges.  By April 2010, the number of listed firms on the GEM reached 200. 
There is abundant evidence showing that China’s stock markets are not efficient in that prices 
and investors’ behavior are not necessarily driven by fundamental values of listed firms.  For 
example, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices are more ‘synchronous” (stock prices move up 
and down together) in emerging countries including China than in developed countries.  They 
attribute this phenomenon to poor minority investor protection and imperfect regulation of markets in 
emerging markets.  In addition, there have been numerous lawsuits against insider trading and 
manipulation (see, e.g., AQQ (2008), for more details).  In many cases, unlike Enron and other well 
known companies in developed markets stricken by corporate scandals, managers and other insiders 
from the Chinese companies did not use any sophisticated accounting and finance maneuvers to hide 
their losses (even by China’s standards).  These cases reveal that the inefficiencies in the Chinese 
stock markets can be (partially) attributed to poor and ineffective regulation.  We discuss below 
issues related to regulation, market efficiency, and the further development of China’s financial 
markets.   
IV.2 Overview of Bond Markets 
  Table 5-B provides information on China’s bond markets.  The government bond market had 
an annual growth rate of 25.3% during the period 1990-2009 in terms of newly issued bonds, while 
total outstanding bonds reached RMB 4,976.8 billion (or $721.3 billion) at the end of 2008.
25  The 
second largest component of the bond market is called “policy financial bonds” (total outstanding 
                                                           
25 On July 26, 2007, Moody’s raised the rating on China’s government bonds to A1 from A2 and kept it unchanged up to 
now. In November 2009 it raised China’s sovereign rating outlook from stable to positive. These ratings are better or 
comparable than Moody’s ratings on government bonds from most emerging economies.    26
amount RMB 3,668.6 billion (or $531.7 billion) at the end of 2008.  These bonds are issued by 
“policy banks,” which operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, and the proceeds of 
bond issuance are invested in government run projects and industries such as infrastructure 
construction (similar to municipal bonds in the U.S.).  Compared to government-issued bonds, the 
size of the corporate bond market is small. In terms of the amount of outstanding bonds at the end of 
2008, the corporate bond market is less than one-fourth of the size of the government bond market. 
However, the growth of the corporate bond market has picked up pace in the past few years and this 
trend is likely to continue in the near future. 
Insert Table 5-B here. 
  The small size of the bond market, especially the corporate bond market, relative to the stock 
market, is common among Asian countries.  AQQ (2008) compares different components (bank loans 
to the private sectors or the Hybrid Sector of China; stock market capitalization; public/government 
and private/corporate bond markets) of the financial markets around the world at the end of 2003.  
Compared to Europe and the U.S., they find that the size of both the government (public) and 
corporate (private) bond markets is smaller in Asia excluding Japan (Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand); even in Japan, the size of the 
corporate bond market is much smaller compared with its government bond market.  They also find 
that the size of all four components of China’s financial markets are small relative to that of other 
regions and countries, including bank loans made to the Hybrid Sector (private sector) in China 
(other countries).  Moreover, the most under-developed component of China’s financial markets is 
the corporate bond market (labeled “private” bond market). 
There are a number of reasons for the underdevelopment in bond markets in China and other 
parts of Asia (see, e.g., Herring and Chatusripitak 2000).  Lack of sound accounting/auditing systems 
and high-quality bond-rating agencies is a factor.
26  Given low creditor protection and court 
inefficiency (in China and most other emerging economies) the recovery rates for bondholders during 
default are low, which in turn leads to underinvestment in the market (by domestic and foreign 
investors).  Lack of a well constructed yield curve is another factor in China, given the small size of 
the publicly traded Treasury bond market and lack of historical prices. The situation is improving 
however, as the terms of China’s Treasury bonds now ranges from one month to 30 years. In 
December 2009, China’s first 50-year government bond made its trading debut simultaneously in the 
                                                           
26 Dagong Global Credit Ratings, a leading Chinese credit ratings agency, recently released its first sovereign ratings 
report, in which the Chinese and German sovereign debt received higher ratings (AA+ and a stable outlook) than those of 
US, the UK and Japan (AA or lower ratings and a negative outlook; Bloomberg, 7/14/2010).   27
interbank market and the stock exchange bond market, extending the bond yield curve even further.  
The deficiencies in the term structure of interest rates have hampered the development of derivatives 
markets that enable firms and investors to manage risk, as well as the effectiveness of the 
government’s macroeconomic policies.  Therefore, further development of China’s bond markets, 
along with its legal system and related institutions, can help the advancement of other markets and 
the overall financial system. 
IV.3 Evidence on the Listed Sector 
In this section, we briefly examine publicly listed and traded companies in China.  It is 
worthwhile to first clarify whether firms from the Hybrid Sector can become listed and publicly 
traded.  Regulations and laws (the 1986 trial version of the bankruptcy law and the 1999 version of 
the Company Law) did not prohibit the listing of Hybrid Sector firms; and selected firms from the 
Hybrid Sector did enter the Listed Sector through an IPO or acquisition of a listed firm from the 
inception of SHSE and SZSE.  However, the accessibility of equity markets for these firms has been 
much lower than for former SOEs in practice due to the enforcement of the listing standards and 
process.  As a result, AQQ (2005) find that 80% of their sample of more than 1,100 listed firms are 
converted from former SOEs.  In recent years, the government has attempted to change the 
composition of listed firms by relaxing regulations toward Hybrid Sector firms, including the 
establishment of the recently opened GEM. 
  Until the recent share reform, which is discussed further below, listed firms in China issued 
both tradable and nontradable shares (Table 6-A).  The nontradable shares were either held by the 
government or by other state-owned legal entities (i.e., other listed or non-listed firms or 
organizations).  Table 6-B shows that, as of the end of 2009, nontradable shares constituted around 
half of all shares (53%, column 2) and the majority of tradable shares were A shares.  Among the 
tradable shares, Class A and B shares are listed and traded in either the SHSE or SZSE, while Class A 
(B) shares are issued to and traded by Chinese investors (foreign investors including those from 
Taiwan and Hong Kong and QFIIs).  While the two share classes issued by the same firm are 
identical in terms of shareholder rights (e.g., voting and dividend), B shares were traded at a 
significant discount relative to A shares and are traded less frequently than A shares.
27  The “B share 
discount” has been reduced significantly since the CSRC allowed Chinese citizens to invest and trade 
                                                           
27 Explanations of the B share discount include: 1) Foreign investors face higher information asymmetry than domestic 
investors, 2) lower B share prices compensate for the lack of liquidity (due to low trading volume), and 3) the A share 
premium reflects a speculative bubble component among domestic investors.  See, e.g., Chan, Menkveld, and Yang 
(2007) and Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) for more details.     28
B shares (with foreign currency accounts) in 2001.  In addition, Class H shares, issued by selected 
“Red Chip” Chinese companies, are listed and traded on the HKSE.  Finally, there are N shares and S 
shares for firms listed in the U.S. and Singapore but operate in China (we omit discussions on these 
shares since they are not listed on the domestic exchanges).  After the share reforms discussed below 
in Section IV.7, government shares became G shares and are tradable. 
Insert Tables 6-A and 6-B here. 
  We next describe standard corporate governance mechanisms in the Listed Sector.  First, 
according to the (2005) Company Law, listed firms in China have a two-tier board structure: the 
Board of Directors (five to nineteen members) and the Board of Supervisors (at least three members), 
with supervisors ranking above directors.  The main duty of the Board of Supervisors is to monitor 
firms’ operations as well as top managers and directors; it consists of representatives of shareholders 
and employees, with the rest either officials chosen from government branches or executives from the 
parent companies; directors and top managers of the firms cannot hold positions as supervisors.  The 
company has the discretion to decide the number of representatives of employees on the Board of 
Supervisors, but representatives of employees must account for at least one third of the board.  The 
Board of Directors serves similar duties as their counterparts in the U.S., including appointing and 
firing CEOs.  According to the “one-share, one-vote” scheme adopted by firms in the Listed Sector, 
shareholders including the state and legal person shareholders (that typically own the majority of 
shares) appoint the board members.  Specifically, the Chairman (one person) and Vice Chairman (one 
or two) of the Board are elected by all directors (majority votes); at the approval of the Board, the 
CEO and other top managers can become members of the Board.  The CSRC requires at least one 
third (and a minimum of two people) of the Board to be independent. 
Since the Law does not specify that every member of the Board must be elected by 
shareholders during general shareholder meetings, in practice some directors are nominated and 
appointed by the firms’ parent companies and the nomination process is usually kept secret, in 
particular for former SOEs.  Since not all members of either board are elected by shareholders, a 
major problem with the board structure is the appointment of and contracting with the CEOs.  Based 
on firm-level compensation data (available since 1998 due to disclosure requirements), Fung et al. 
(2003) and Kato and Long (2004) find that no listed firms grant stock options to CEOs or board 
members.  The situation is somewhat different now. Among overseas listed SOEs, barriers to 
exercising stock options have been overcome, and some senior executives have been granted stock 
options (examples include the former chairman of CNOOC Wei Liucheng and Bank of China-Hong   29
Kong former chairman Liu Mingkang) and received substantial rewards (Caijing Magazine, 2008). 
However, the cash-based compensation level for CEOs is still much lower than their counterparts in 
developed countries, and the consumption of perks, such as company cars, is prevalent. 
  Second, the existing ownership structure, characterized by the large amount of non-tradable 
shares including cross-holdings of shares among listed companies and institutions, makes it difficult 
for value-increasing M&As.  According to the China Venture Source, there were 2,656 M&A deals 
involving listed firms in 2010 totaling US$169.6 billion, a small fraction of the total market 
capitalization.  In many deals, a Hybrid Sector firm (non-listed) acquires a listed firm that is 
converted from an SOE, but the large amount of non-tradable shares held by the state remain intact 
after the transaction.
28  Such an acquisition can be the means through which low quality, non-listed 
companies bypass listing standards and access financial markets (e.g., Du et al., 2008).  
  Third, one factor contributing to the occurrence of corporate scandals is the lack of 
institutional investors (including non-depository financial intermediaries) as they are a very recent 
addition to the set of financial institutions in China.  Professional investors would perhaps not be so 
easily taken in by simple deceptions.  Another factor is that the enforcement of laws is questionable 
due to the lack of legal professionals and institutions.   
Fourth, the government plays the dual roles of regulator and blockholder for many listed 
firms, including banks and financial services companies.  The main role of the CSRC (counterpart of 
the SEC in the U.S.) is to monitor and regulate stock exchanges and listed companies.  The 
government exercises its shareholder control rights in listed firms through the Bureau of National 
Assets Management, which holds large fractions of nontradable shares, or other SOEs (with their 
holdings of nontradable shares).  However, since the senior managers of the Bureau are government 
officials, it is doubtful that they will pursue their fiduciary role as controlling shareholders diligently, 
since their compensation is probably not incentive-based; even if their compensation was tied to 
performance, they may lack the expertise to make the correct strategic decisions.  Moreover, the 
government’s dual roles can lead to conflicting goals (maximizing profits as shareholder vs. 
maximizing social welfare as regulator or social planner) in dealing with listed firms, which in turn 
                                                           
28 If we include the cross-border M&As and transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries, the total amount 
increases to US $47 billion in 2000, $14 billion in 2001, $29 billion in 2002, and $24 billion in the first three quarters of 
2003. 68% of all M&A deals (66% in terms of dollar deal amount) are initiated by Hybrid Sector firms, while former 
SOEs and foreign firms initiate 29% and 3% of the rest, respectively (27% and 7% in deal amount).  M&As are most 
active in coastal regions, and in industries such as machinery, information technology, retail, and gas and oil.   30
weaken the effectiveness of both of its roles.
29  There are cases in which the government, aiming to 
achieve certain social goals, influenced the markets through state-owned institutional investors (e.g., 
asset management companies) but created unintended adverse effects.  Based on a sample of 625 
firms with 28% of the CEOs being ex- or current government bureaucrats, Fan et al. (2007) find that 
the three-year post-IPO average stock returns of the sample underperform the market by 20%, and the 
underperformance of firms with such politically-connected CEOs exceeds those without politically-
connected CEOs by almost 30%.  Firms with politically-connected CEOs are also more likely to 
appoint other bureaucrats but not personnel with relevant professional to boards of directors.  
Overall, internal and external governance for the Listed Sector is weak, and further 
development of governance mechanisms is likely in this sector going forward. In Section IV.7 below 
we further discuss this issue..   
IV.4 Real Estate Market 
Like other economic sectors, China’s real estate market has long been operating under the 
‘dual tracks’ of both central planning and market-oriented systems.  Prior to 1998, government 
control was dominant with the market only playing a secondary role, and mortgages were not 
designated for retail customers and households.  Chinese citizens working for the government and 
government owned companies and organizations could purchase properties at prices significantly 
below market prices, with the subsidies coming from their employers.  The reform policies 
introduced in 1998 aimed to end the distribution of properties by employers and establish new 
housing finance and market systems.  Provinces and autonomous regions have established programs 
to sell properties (e.g., apartments in urban areas) to individuals instead of allocating residency as 
part of the employment benefits.   
Since 1998 the residential housing reform and the development of individual mortgages, 
along with rising household income and demand for quality housing, had stimulated the fast growth 
of the real estate market.  Figure 4-A shows the total real estate investments and their funding sources 
over time.  Total investment increased from RMB 321 billion in 1996, 12% of the national fixed 
assets investments, to RMB 4.8 trillion in 2010 and 20% of the national fixed assets investment.  
Most of the investment funds have come from domestic sources.  Not surprisingly, bank loans are the 
most important source of real estate financing.  China’s continuing economic growth especially in 
private sectors, urbanization and industrialization, limited land supply, increasing foreign direct 
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government branches, and how these relationships affect the decision-making process of regulations and enforcement.     31
investments and institutional investments, will further enhance the liquidity and long-term prospects 
of China’s real estate assets.  
As the real estate sector gained more weight in the economy, its impact on other industries, 
especially the financial and banking industries, increased considerably.  With the expansion of the 
real estate market, banks and other financial institutions lent more to keep up with the demand for 
financing.  When the fast expansion, in part fueled by the inflows of speculative capital and agency 
problems in investment, could not be sustained, increased demand led to hikes in property prices 
andreal estate bubbles surfaced. The bursting of such bubbles can lead to painful consequences in the 
entire economy.       
Insert Figures 4-A, 4-B and 4-C here. 
The real estate prices in major cities have risen sharply in recent years, and whether these fast 
growing prices are ‘bubbles’ and how to cool down the markets are among the most closely watched 
and hotly debated issues in China.  We provide some simple analysis here; for a more thorough and 
careful analysis see, e.g., Wu, Gyourko, and Deng (2011).  Figure 4-B shows the trends of total 
housing space developed vs. total space sold over the period 2002-2009 for the entire nation, and 
Figure 4-C compares the growth rates of total housing space developed vs. total space sold; actual 
space is normalized so that both charts begin at 100 in 2002; hence the vertical axis measures growth 
rates.  We can see that while total space developed and total space sold (for both residential and 
nonresidential properties) grew at similar rates over the period (Figure 4-C), the gap between total 
space developed and sold—a proxy for the inventory of housing supply in the markets—widened 
from around 0.6 billion square meters in 2002 to 2.2 billion square meters in 2009.  
In Figures 5-A through 5-E we plot and compare growth rates of average housing prices and 
disposable household income, over the period 2002-2009, for the nation and the four major cities: 
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou.  Once again, actual housing prices (RMB per square 
meter) and disposable income are normalized so that both charts begin at 100 in 2002; hence the 
vertical axis measures growth rates and all the figures for prices and income are inflation adjusted.  
Steady growth of disposable income in line with rising housing prices can help sustain the growth of 
the housing markets, and hence considerable and increasing gaps in the growth rates reflect potential 
bubbles in the housing markets.  Based on the figures it appears that while at the national level and in 
the city of Guangzhou there are no signs of bubbles, the opposite can be said for the large regional 
markets in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, where housing prices are rising at much higher paces 
than those of real disposable income in recent years.  Shenzhen presents the most worrisome case,   32
where despite fast-rising housing prices fueled by the inflow of speculative capital, real household 
income actually declined in 2008 and 2009 (from 2007 levels), perhaps (partially) due to the adverse 
effects of the global financial crisis on the exporting sectors, which rely mainly on migrant workers 
from other regions.                  
Insert Figures 5-A, 5-B, 5-C, 5-D, and 5-E here. 
We would like to emphasize again that our results are based on simple measures; however, 
analyses from Wu et al. (2010), who use more sophisticated metrics and regressions controlling for 
other factors that may affect housing prices, yield similar results that there may well be bubbles in the 
regional markets of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen.  There is some evidence that speculative 
foreign capital (the “hot money”) flowing into China is partially responsible for the accelerated rise in 
real estate markets (e.g., Chu and Sing, 2004; Guo and Huang, 2009).  Given the rising status of the 
Chinese economy and its currency, coupled with the weakening of the U.S. economy (and other 
developed countries), the dollar and near-zero interest rates in most developed countries, the inflow 
of ‘hot money’ into China’s real estate markets (and other sectors) may continue. 
The government has been taking aggressive measures to control property prices.  Since 2004, 
it has issued new policies in order to suppress speculative activities; another policy measure to 
control the growth of the real estate market is through the PBOC’s required reserve deposit ratio.  In 
2010 and 2011, in response to the fast rising housing prices, the government has announced a series 
of interventions including: (a) increased equity down payment shares from 20% to 30% for first 
homes of more than 90 square meters in size; (b) increased equity down payment shares from 40% to 
50% for second homes; (c) general discouragement of the use of any leverage on third homes or by 
external buyers (i.e., those not living in the market of the intended purchase); (d) new rules to prevent 
developers from hoarding housing units; (e) preparation of the introduction of a local property tax, 
with possible pilot implementations in Chongqing, a large city in the southwestern region that is 
under direct control of the central government, within the next one to two years; and (f) direct 
administrative orders on how much land and units of buildings can be developed.
30  Among these 
measures, the proposed property tax may play a significant role in cooling down the markets, because 
it would raise the cost of carry on speculative investments in owner-occupied housing.  
Despite the government’s macroprudential policies in recent years and the newly announced 
measures and strong signals in recent months, the impact of these measures on the housing markets 
                                                           
30 For more details, see “Gazette of Executive Meeting of the State Council,” December 14th, 2009; and “Circular of the 
State Council on Resolutely Containing the Precipitous Rise of Housing Prices in Some Cities” (Decree No. [2010] 10), 
April 17th, 2010, and Wu et al. (2010).   33
seems to be limited.  One reason, as stipulated by many observers, is that since various government 
agencies and officials have played a major role in developing ‘commercial properties’ it is not in their 
best interest to see major market corrections.  The evidence in Wu et al. (2010) provides some 
support of this view.  They find that much of the increase in housing prices is occurring in land 
values.  Using land auctions data from Beijing, they also find SOEs controlled by the central 
government paid 27% more than other bidders for an otherwise equivalent land parcel.  Since many 
vested government officials have a lot to lose following a crash in the real estate markets, it is argued 
that the new measures, including the proposed property taxes, will not be effectively enforced; such a 
belief can also explain why speculative capital continues to enter the housing markets.   
Given the experiences of many other countries in the recent and previous financial crises, the 
government’s efforts in controlling the rise of housing markets in the aforementioned regions, and 
preventing this spreading to other regions of the country can augment its other efforts in stabilizing 
the economy and alleviating social tensions.  In Section VI below we further examine how the inflow 
of speculative capital and subsequent outflow can create bubbles in the markets and then the bursting 
of the bubbles can spread to other sectors of the economy.  
 
IV.5 Private Equity/Venture Capital and the Funding of New Industries 
Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) have suggested that stock market-based economies, such as the 
U.K. in the 19
th century and the U.S. in the 20
th century, have been more successful in developing 
new industries than intermediary-based economies such as Germany and Japan.  They argue that 
markets are better than banks for funding new industries, because evaluation of these industries based 
on experience is difficult, and there is wide diversity of opinion.  Stock market-based economies such 
as the U.S. and U.K. also tend to have well-developed systems for the acquisition and distribution of 
information, so the cost of information to investors is low.  Markets then work well because investors 
can gather information at low costs and those that anticipate high profits can provide the finance to 
the firms operating in the new industries.  
A key part of this process is the private equity/venture capital sector (see, e.g., Kortum and 
Lerner 2000).  Venture capitalists are able to raise large amounts of funds in the U.S. because of the 
prospect that successful firms will be able to undertake an IPO.  With data from 21 countries, Jeng 
and Wells (2000) find that venture capital is less important in other countries, while the existence of 
an active IPO market is the critical determinant of the importance of venture capital in a country.  
This is consistent with the finding of Black and Gilson (1998) in a comparison of the U.S. and   34
Germany, that the primary reason venture capital is relatively successful in the U.S. is the active IPO 
market that exists there.      
These facts imply that the development of active venture capital and private equity markets 
can increase the financing for China’s new industries.  What is unusual about China (perhaps along 
with India) is that it currently has the ability to develop both traditional industries, such as 
manufacturing, and in the near future new, high-tech industries, such as aerospace, computer 
software, semiconductors, and bio-genetics.  This is different from the experience of South Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1970s and that of most other emerging economies in the 1990s, as all these other 
countries focused on developing manufacturing industries first.  In terms of developing traditional 
industries (e.g., Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s), China has already followed suit in first introducing 
advanced (relative to domestic companies) but not the most advanced technologies from developed 
countries; and “nationalizing” these technologies within designated companies before moving toward 
the more advanced technologies.  Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) argue that banks are better than 
financial markets for funding mature industries because there is wide agreement on how they are best 
managed, so the delegation of the investment decision to a bank works well.  This delegation process, 
and the economies of scale in information acquisition through delegation, makes bank-based systems 
more efficient in terms of financing the growth in these industries.  Therefore, the banking system 
can contribute more in supporting the growth and development of these industries than markets.  
 
IV.6 Asset Management Industries 
The mutual fund industry in China has gone through three stages of development.  The first 
stage is between 1992, when China’s first fund (LiuBo) was established, and 1997, when the first 
version of the mutual fund regulation was drafted and passed by the CSRC.  The LiuBo Fund was a 
closed-end fund with NAV RMB100 million RMB ($12.5 million) and began to trade on the SHSE 
in 1993.  While the industry experienced fast growth in the few years after 1992, lack of regulation 
and problems associated with fund trading hampered the further development of the industry.  The 
first open-end fund was established in September, 2001 (Hua An Chuangxin), following the 
announcement of the proposal for open-end fund investment by the CSRC, a milestone for China’s 
mutual fund industry.     
Figure 6 shows the development of the mutual fund industry in China.  With only a handful of 
funds in 1998, China now has sixty-five fund companies managing 551 different funds as of 
November 2009.  The total net assets value increased from RMB11 billion (or $1.3 Billion) in 1998   35
to about RMB 2.26 trillion (or $328 billion) in November 2009 (this figure was much higher in the 
second half of 2007 before the markets went south).  In 2001, the NAV of all funds was about 0.8% 
of GDP and 1.19% of total national savings; these figures rose to 6.16% of GDP and 8.58% of total 
savings in 2008.  The growth of open-end funds contributed to most of the growth in the industry.  As 
of November 2009, 520 funds are open-ended and 31 are close-ended, with 96% of the total fund 
value managed by open-end funds.  The most popular investment style is actively managed 
(domestic) equity, with only a few index funds and ETFs (exchange traded funds). 
Insert Figure 6 here. 
Many mutual fund companies are owned by securities and other financial services companies.  
Like their counterparts in the U.S., management fees are the major source of income for fund 
companies, accounting for about 80% of total income.  Administration fees account for 9% of total 
income, and the rest of the income comes from investment and other incomes.  More than half of the 
fund managers have a master-level or higher academic degree, and the majority of them are 36 to 45 
years old.  Investment capital from institutional investors is about the same as that from individual 
investors in 2005, but in 2006 individual investors account for 70% of the total mutual fund 
investment.  Among the 23 newly launched funds in the first half of 2009, individual investors 
account for 75.8%. 
The first fund managed by a qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) was set up in 2002. 
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is the government agent that regulates the 
QFII funds.  The QFII Act allows foreign investors to invest in Chinese securities, with the intention 
of introducing sophisticated foreign investors to the Chinese market with the hope that their presence 
would improve market efficiency.  In addition, with the exercise of their shareholder rights, their 
presence can also help improve corporate governance of the Listed Sector.  However, the original 
QFII rules imposed restrictions on foreign investors, such as a capital lock-up period of one to three 
years limiting capital withdrawal (and leaving China) and other operating restrictions.  In August 
2006, CSRC revised QFII rules to promote more participation from foreign investors.  Under the new 
rules, there has been a significant increase in applications from foreign investors for QFII quotas.   
Most of the institutions in the first group of QFII applicants were securities companies and 
investment banks, with other financial services companies such as insurance companies and pension 
fund companies also on the list.  By the end of July 2006, China had approved a total of $7.495 
billion foreign investment capital (quota) from 45 QFIIs, or three quarters of the then ceiling of $10 
billion capital inflow through QFIIs.  In December 2007, the investment quota/ceiling tripled, from   36
$10 billion to $30 billion.  In September 2009, draft rules were issued by SAFE to increase the 
upward limit of investment for an individual QFII institution to $1 billion from the previous $800 
million. Some analysts believe that the move to increase the QFII quota was also intended to prepare 
for the large amount of floating of non-tradable shares.  If the holders of the newly floated shares rush 
to sell, QFII funds can be a stabilizing source of the market.  As of August 2011, there were a total of 
116 approved QFIIs operating in China, of which 103 were investment funds. The approved 
investment quotas reached $20.69 billion.   
The approval of qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) to invest in overseas markets 
came after QFII, in July 2006.  The QDII funds invest in stocks, bonds, real estate investment trusts 
and other mainstream financial products in markets such as New York, London, Tokyo and Hong 
Kong.  Similarly to the QFII scheme, it is a transitional arrangement that provides limited 
opportunities for domestic investors to access foreign markets at a stage in which a country/territory’s 
currency is not freely convertible and capital flows are restricted.  As of early 2008, ten fund 
companies had obtained the approval to launch QDII. The total number of QDII funds reached 75 in 
July 2009.  By April 2011, QDIIs had approved investment quotas of $72.67 billion.  Given the 
recent turmoil in the global financial markets, the performance of the QDII funds has been less than 
stellar.  Going forward, the probable continuing appreciation of the RMB against major international 
currencies including the dollar is a major concern for QDII investors.   
China’s asset management industry is expected to continue its growth in the near future.  In 
the U.S., mutual funds became the largest group of financial intermediaries in financial markets in 
1999, holding 29% of all financial assets.  By contrast, mutual funds in China only held around 8.1% 
of all financial assets as at the end of 2009. The further growth of the economy and continuing reform 
of the pension system will generate both demand and supply of capital for the industry.  If the trend 
of opening up domestic markets to foreign investors continues, there will be a greater inflow of 
QFIIs.   
 
IV.7 Further Changes in Financial Markets 
  As we have documented, the financial markets in China do not currently play nearly as 
important a role as banks.  Going forward, further improvements in the operation of China’s financial 
markets can help to promote the development of high-technology industries as discussed in Section 
IV.5.  In addition, developing new financial products and markets can enhance the risk management 
capabilities of China’s financial institutions and firms.  Finally, deep and efficient markets can   37
provide an alternative to banks for raising large amounts of capital. 
In recent years the performance of the stock markets has been volatile.  This is somewhat 
surprising given the robust performance of the real economy.  We attribute this (relatively) poor 
performance to a number of factors including the following: 
(i)  Limited self-regulation and formal regulation.  
(ii)  The large overhang of shares owned by government entities. 
(iii)  The lack of listed firms originating in the Hybrid Sector. 
(iv)  The lack of trained professionals. 
(v)  The lack of institutional investors. 
(vi)  Limited financial markets and products. 
Efforts have been made to address some of these weaknesses.  However, some of these are 
problems can only be tackled over the long run. We discuss each in turn. 
Regulations 
  There are two ways in which markets are regulated in practice and each has advantages and 
disadvantages: first, market forces and self-regulation, and second, government regulation.  
  A good example of regulation through market forces and self-regulation is provided by the 
capital markets in the UK in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Michie, 1987).  The role of 
government regulation and intervention was minimal.  Despite this the markets did extremely well 
and London became the financial capital of the world.  Many firms and countries from all over the 
world raised large amounts of funds.  Reputation and trust were an important factor in the smooth 
operation of these markets.  For example, Franks et al. (2003) compare the early twentieth century 
capital markets with those in the mid-twentieth century.  Despite extensive changes in the laws 
protecting minority shareholders there was very little change in the ways in which the market 
operated.  The authors attribute this to the importance of trust. 
  We argue below that China’s Hybrid sector is another example of a situation where market 
forces are effective.  Formal regulation and legal protections do not play much of a role and yet 
financing and governance mechanisms are quite effective.  In this case, as we shall see, it appears that 
competition as well as reputation and trust work well. 
  In contrast, the examples of fraud and other problems of manipulation and the inefficiency of 
markets pointed to in Section IV.1 suggest that in China’s formal financial markets these alternative 
mechanisms do not work well.  Although such mechanisms may develop in the long run as in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century U.K., in the short run formal government regulation of the   38
type introduced in the U.S. in the 1930s and subsequently as a response to the stock market collapse 
that started in 1929 and the Great Depression may allow Chinese markets to function better.  There is 
evidence from many countries that this type of formal regulation is effective.  For example, based on 
a study of securities laws with the focus on the public issuance of new equity in 49 countries (China 
is not included) LLS (2006) find that disclosure and liability rules help to promote stock market 
development. 
Sale of Government Shares in Listed Firms 
One of the major problems Chinese stock markets have faced in recent years has been caused 
by the large amount of shares in listed companies owned by the government and government entities 
shown in Table 6-B.  The Chinese government attempted sales of state shares of selected firms in 
1999 and 2001, but halted the process both times after share prices plunged and investors grew 
panicky about the value of the entire market.  This overhang created great uncertainty about the 
quantity of shares that would come onto the market going forward.  This uncertainty was probably in 
part responsible for the stagnation of share prices between 2002 and 2005 despite the very high levels 
of growth in the economy.   
In 2005 the government announced a plan of “fully floating” state shares.  Under the plan, the 
remaining state shares among listed firms were converted to “G” shares.  The CSRC outlined the 
format for compensating existing shareholders and also imposed lockups and restrictions on the 
amount of G shares that could be sold immediately after they became tradable.  More specifically, the 
plan stipulated that G shares were not to be traded or transferred within 12 months after the 
implementation of the share structure reform.  Shareholders owning more than 5% of the original 
non-tradable shares can only trade less than 5% of the total shares outstanding within one year and 
less than 10% within 2 years.  These restrictions of G share sales were intended to reduce the 
downward pressure on the stock price, maintain market stability and protect the interests of public 
investors.  The details of the “fully floating plan” for a firm, including the number of G shares to be 
granted to each Class A shareholder and the time window (e.g., one to three years) of G shares 
become fully floating, had to be approved by two thirds of Class A shareholders of the firm. 
Share reforms began with a pilot program with only four companies participating in April 
2005.  By the end of 2006, 96% of all the listed companies had completed share reforms; by the end 
of 2007, there were only a few companies that had not reached an agreement with their shareholders   39
on the terms of the reform.
31  As documented in Table 6-B above, as of September 2009, for the first 
time tradable shares accounted for more than half of the stock market, suggesting that the floating of 
nontradable shares is progressing.  
Another fact worth mentioning is that for the firms that go public (IPOs) after the share 
reform, not all of their stocks are immediately floated to the market.  Lock-up periods may still apply 
to large shareholders who obtained the shares before the IPO.  For example, in the case of ABC’s 
recent IPO, the majority of A shares (87.6%) have already been distributed to various agencies of the 
government before the IPO.  In fact, only 25.5 billions A shares (8.6% of total outstanding A shares) 
were issued in the IPO.  Those shares held by the government have a lock-up for 3 years.  However, 
they are technically A (not G) shares.  Thus no compensation will be paid when those shares become 
freely tradable.    
The Listing of Firms from the Hybrid Sector 
One of the major problems of the stock exchanges is that most of the firms listed are former 
SOEs.  Relatively few are firms from the more dynamic Hybrid Sector.  Reforming listing 
requirements and procedures to make it advantageous for dynamic and successful companies to 
become listed on the exchanges can enhance the overall quality of the Listed Sector.  The 
establishment of the recently opened “GEM” provides an example in this regard.  
The Training of More Professionals 
  This step will allowan improvement in the enforcement of laws and contracts. An independent 
and efficient judicial system requires a sufficient supply of qualified legal professionals.  The 
Ministry of Justice of China states that there are 143,000 lawyers and 12,428 law firms as of 2007.  
Two hundred and six out of China’s 2,000 counties still do not have lawyers. Lawyers represent only 
10% to 25% of all clients in civil and business cases, and even in criminal prosecutions, lawyers 
represent defendants in only half of the cases.  Among the approximately five million business 
enterprises in China, only 4% of them currently have regular legal advisers.  Moreover, only one-fifth 
of all lawyers in China have law degrees, and even a lower fraction of judges have formally studied 
law at a university or college.  As mentioned before, a similar situation exists for auditors and 
accounting professionals.  
                                                           
31 Huang et al. (2008) document that share reform increases turnover, especially for firms with low liquidity prior to the 
reform, and reduces speculative trading.  Although share prices drop significantly on the day of share supply increases, 
shareholder wealth increases by 15% overall.  Beltratti and Bortolotti (2006) document an 8% abnormal return around the 
date of share reform announcement.  Liao and Liu (2008) show that market reactions to share reforms are positively 
associated with the quality of the listed firms (as measured by firm disclosure), providing evidence of improved market 
efficiency.   40
Institutional Investors 
In most developed stock markets institutional investors, such as insurance companies, pension 
funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, play an important role.  They employ well-trained 
professionals who are able to evaluate companies well.  This causes markets to have a higher degree 
of efficiency than if they are dominated by individual investors.  In addition, there can be advantages 
in terms of corporate governance if institutional investors actively participate in the monitoring of 
firms’ managers and are directly involved in firms’ decision-making process as blockholders of 
stocks.  For example, in the U.S., pension funds such as CALPERS have become the symbol of 
shareholder activism that strengthens corporate governance, while in Japan and Germany, financial 
intermediaries serve similar purposes.  For China, the efficiency of China’s stock markets as well as 
corporate governance of listed firms can be improved by  further entry of domestic financial 
intermediaries that can act as institutional investors.  With their large-scale capital and expertise in all 
relevant areas of business, financial intermediaries can provide a level of stability and 
professionalism that is sorely lacking in China’s financial markets. 
Currently institutional investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds 
are relatively small in terms of assets held given their early stage of development.  However, they are 
expanding dramatically.  Among policies that can further encourage the development of such 
intermediaries are those that provide tax advantages to various types of products such as life 
insurance and pension related savings and investments.   
A Greater Range of Financial Products and Markets  
More financial products allow investors to form diversified portfolios with more than just 
stocks.  As discussed above, corporate bond markets, along with better enforcement of bankruptcy 
laws and bond rating agencies, provide an alternative class of assets to stocks.  Second, the 
introduction of more derivative securities such as forwards, futures, and options on commodities 
(already in place and trading) as well as on other securities, enlarges the risk management toolbox of 
investors and firms.  In fact, China has launched an index future on April 16th, 2010, tracking the 
Shanghai-based Hushen 300, the index of 300 Shanghai- and Shenzhen listed class A-shares.  On the 
first day four contacts were traded.  Of the 2,200 index future accounts opened as of May 4, 2010, 
95% of them were individuals, and the rest were institutional investors.  The proportion of 
institutional investors is expected to rise in the future, since the index future is targeted mainly toward 
more sophisticated investors for hedging purposes.  The launch of this long awaited index future is a   41
major step in the reform of capital markets in China and introduces a new tool for risk management. 
Along with the index future, margin trading and short selling of shares were also permitted in April. 
Third, the expansion of their coverage and products (e.g., in property and auto insurance as 
well as life and medical insurance) by insurance companies, and the introduction and development of 
asset-backed securities and other structured finance products by financial services companies can 
further diversify the supply of financial products. 
 
V. The Non-standard Financial Sector and Evidence on Hybrid Sector Firms 
  In this section we study how the non-standard financial sector supports firms in the Hybrid 
Sector to raise funds and to grow from start-ups to successful industry leaders.  We also examine the 
alternative governance mechanisms employed by investors and firms that can substitute for formal 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Due to data limitations, much of this evidence is by necessity 
anecdotal or by survey.
32  
We first compare the Hybrid Sector with the State and Listed Sectors to highlight the 
importance of its status in the entire economy in Section V.1.  Second, we consider survey evidence 
in Section V.2.  Finally, Section V.3 provides discussions and comparisons of alternative financing 
channels and governance mechanisms that support the growth of the Hybrid Sector versus formal 
financing channels (through banks and markets) and governance mechanisms (laws and courts). 
V.1 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors  
  Figure 7-A compares the level and growth of industrial output produced in the State and 
Listed Sectors combined vs. that of the Hybrid Sector from 1998 to 2009.
33  The output from the 
Hybrid Sector has been steadily increasing during this period and exceeded that of the other two 
sectors in 1998.  The total output in 2009 is almost $5,700 billion for the Hybrid Sector, while it is 
around $2,500 billion in the State and Listed Sectors combined.
34  The Hybrid Sector grew at an 
annual rate of over 23% between 1998 and 2009, while the State and Listed Sectors combined grew 
                                                           
32 All firms including Hybrid Sector firms must disclose accounting and financial information to the local Bureau of 
Commerce and Industry, and most of the reports are audited.  However, these data are then aggregated into the Statistical 
Yearbook without any firm-level publications. 
33 The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China revised its total industrial output statistics in the 2000 year book 
without any explicit explanations. The outputs in previous years (i.e. 1997) were significantly revised down compared to 
the 1998 year book. To be consistent and avoid confusion, we only use data from the NBS after 1998.  
34 Due to data limitations, our calculations underestimate the output of the State and Listed Sectors.  We use the output 
produced by SOEs and listed firms in which the state has at least a 50% ownership stake as the total output for these 
sectors, but this calculation excludes output from listed firms that are not majority owned by the state; the output for the 
Hybrid Sector is the difference between the total output and the total for the other two sectors.  However, as mentioned 
above, only around 20% of all listed firms do not have the state as the largest owner, hence the total output of these firms 
is not likely to change our overall conclusion on the dominance of the Hybrid Sector over the other two sectors.   42
at around 15% during the same period.
35  In addition, the growth rates for investment in fixed assets 
of these sectors are comparable (China Statistics Yearbooks; and AQQ (2005)), which implies that 
the Hybrid Sector is more productive than the State and Listed Sectors.  In fact, with large samples of 
firms (from sources) with various ownership structures, Liu (2007) and Dollar and Wei (2007) both 
find that the returns to capital is much higher in non-state sectors than the State Sector, and that a 
capital reallocation from state to private sectors will generate more growth in the economy.  Fan et al. 
(2006) and Li et al. (2007) find that state-owned firms in China have a much easier access to the debt 
market and accordingly higher leverage than non-state firms.  One reason for the differences is that 
due to government protection (for economic and social/political reasons) the costs for bankruptcy and 
financial distress are much lower for state-owned firms.  These firms also have easier access to bank 
loans, especially credit extended by state-owned banks.   
All of the above facts make the growth of the Hybrid Sector even more impressive.  Not 
surprisingly, there has been a fundamental change among the State, Listed, and Hybrid Sectors in 
terms of their contribution to the entire economy: the State Sector contributed more than two thirds of 
China’s GDP in 1980 and (non-agricultural) privately owned firms, a type of Hybrid Sector firm, 
were negligible, but in 2009 the State Sector only contributed 30% of the GDP (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1998-2010).  The above trend of the Hybrid Sector replacing the State Sector is likely to 
continue in the near future. 
Insert Figures 7-A and 7-B here. 
 
  Figure 7-B presents the number and growth of non-agricultural employees in the three sectors.  
The Hybrid Sector is a much more significant source for employment opportunities than the State and 
Listed Sectors.  Over the period from 1990 to 2010, the Hybrid Sector employs an average of over 
77% of all non-agricultural workers; the TVEs (part of the Hybrid Sector) have been the most 
important employers providing (non-agricultural) jobs for residents in the rural areas, while (non-
agricultural) privately owned firms employ more than 40% of the workforce in the urban areas. 
Moreover, the number of employees working in the Hybrid Sector has been growing at 1.5% over 
this period, while the labor force in the State and Listed Sectors has been shrinking.
36  These patterns 
                                                           
35 There is an ongoing process of privatizing SOEs. Potentially this may bias the growth rate of the Hybrid Sector higher, 
as there are firms shifting from the State Sector to the Hybrid Sector. However, the overwhelming majority of SOEs 
became Listed Sector firms (the main channel through which SOEs were partially privatized prior to 2004), thus this 
process is unlikely to change the validity of the results above. 
36 Our calculations of the total number of workers employed by the Hybrid Sector actually underestimate the actual work 
force in the sector, because the Chinese Statistics Yearbooks do not provide employment data for all types of firms (by 
ownership structure), especially small firms, in the Hybrid Sector.   43
are particularly relevant for China, given its vast population and potential problem of unemployment. 
V.2 Survey Evidence  
  Much of the information concerning the Hybrid Sector comes from surveys.  We focus on 
evidence in AQQ (2005a) and Cull and Xu (2005).  The most significant findings of these surveys 
regarding financing channels are the following.  First, during the startup stage, funds from founders’ 
family and friends are an essential source of financing.  Banks can also play an important role.  
Second, internal financing, in the form of retained earnings, is also important.  During their growth 
period financing from private credit agencies (PCAs), instead of banks, as well as trade credits are 
key channels for firms in AQQ’s sample.  As documented by Tsai (2002), PCAs take on many forms, 
from shareholding cooperative enterprises run by professional money brokers, lenders and 
middlemen, to credit associations operated by a group of entrepreneurs (raising money from group 
members and from outsiders to fund firms; zijin huzushe), from pawnshops to underground private 
money houses.  
As far as corporate governance is concerned, when asked about what type of losses concern 
them the most if the firm failed, every firm’s founders/executives (100%) included in the AQQ study 
said reputation loss is a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic losses are of major 
concern.  Competition also appears to be an important factor ensuring firms are well run.   
Cull and Xu (2005) find that firms in most regions and cities rely on courts to resolve less 
than 10% of business-related disputes (the highest percentage is 20%), with a higher reliance on 
courts in coastal and more developed areas.  One reason that firms go to courts to resolve a dispute is 
because the courts are authoritative so that the dispute will be resolved even though the resolution 
may not be fair (e.g., Clarke et al. 2008).  
V.3 Discussion on How the Non-standard Financial Sector Works 
  In this subsection we first discuss mechanisms within the non-standard financial sector in 
supporting the growth of the Hybrid Sector.  We then compare these alternative institutions that 
operate outside the legal system with the law and legal institutions that have been widely regarded as 
the basis for conducting finance and commerce.  There are two aspects to alternative financing 
channels in the Hybrid Sector.  The first is the way in which investment is financed.  The second is 
corporate governance.  We consider each in turn.  
  Once a firm is established and doing well, internal finance can provide the funds necessary for 
growth.  AQQ (2005a) find that about 60 percent of the funds raised by the Hybrid Sector are 
generated internally.  Of course, internal finance is fine once a firm is established but this raises the   44
issue of how firms in the Hybrid Sector acquire their “seed” capital, perhaps the most crucial 
financing during a firm’s life cycle.  AQQ present evidence on the importance of alternative and 
informal channels, including funds from family and friends and loans from private (unofficial) credit 
agencies (see also Tsai (2002)).  There is also evidence that financing through illegal channels, such 
as smuggling, bribery, insider trading and speculations during early stages of the development of 
financial markets and real estate market, and other underground or unofficial businesses can also play 
a critical role in the accumulation of seed capital.   
  Perhaps the most significant corporate governance mechanism is competition in product and 
input markets, which has worked well in both developed and developing countries (e.g., McMillan 
1995, 1997; Allen and Gale 2000b).  What we see from the success of Hybrid Sector firms in 
WenZhou and other surveyed firms recounted in AQQ, suggest that it is only those firms that have 
the strongest comparative advantage in an industry (of the area) that survived and thrived.  A relevant 
factor for competition in an industry is entry barriers for new firms, as lower entry barriers foster 
competition.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (DLLS hereafter, 2002) examine 
entry barriers across 85 countries, and find that countries with heavier (lighter) regulation of entry 
have higher government corruption (more democratic and limited governments) and larger unofficial 
economies.  With much lower barriers to entry compared to other countries with similar (low) per 
capita GDP, China is once again an “outlier” in the DLLS sample given that China is one of the least 
democratic countries, and such countries tend to have high barriers to entry.  Survey evidence from 
AQQ (2005a) reveals that there exist non-standard methods to remove entry barriers in China, which 
can reconcile these seemingly contradictory facts.  
Another mechanism is reputation, trust, and relationships.  Greif (1989, 1993) argues that 
certain traders’ organizations in the 11
th century were able to overcome problems of asymmetric 
information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms, because they had developed 
institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual relations, and coalitions.  Certain aspects of the 
growth of these institutions resemble what worked to promote commerce and the financial system in 
China prior to 1949 (e.g., Kirby (1995)) and the operation of the non-standard financial sector today 
(AQQ (2005a)), in terms of how firms raise funds and contract with investors and business partners.  
In addition, Greif (1993) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) point out the importance of cultural and 
religious beliefs for the development of institutions, legal origins, and investor protections.  
  The above factors are of particular relevance and importance to China’s development of 
institutions.  Without a dominant religion, some argue that the most important force in shaping   45
China’s social values and institutions is the set of beliefs first developed and formalized by Kongzi 
(Confucius).  This set of beliefs clearly defines family and social orders, which are very different 
from western beliefs on how legal codes are formulated.  Using the World Values Survey conducted 
in the early 1990s, LLSV (1997b) find that China has one of the highest levels of social trust among a 
group of 40 developed and developing countries.
37  We interpret high social trust in China as being 
influenced by Confucian beliefs.  Throughout this chapter and AQQ (2005a, b; 2008) we have 
presented evidence that reputation and relationships make many financing channels and governance 
mechanisms work in China’s Hybrid Sector. 
  There are other effective corporate governance mechanisms.  First, Burkart et al. (2003) link 
the degree of separation of ownership and control to different legal environments, and show that 
family-run firms will emerge as the dominant form of ownership structure in countries with weak 
minority shareholder protections, whereas professionally managed firms are the optimal form in 
countries with strong protection.  Survey evidence on the Hybrid Sector in AQQ and empirical results 
on the Listed Sector, along with evidence in Claessens et al. (2000, 2002) and ACDQQ (2008), 
suggests that family firms are a norm in China and other Asian countries, and these firms have 
performed well.  Second, Allen and Gale (2000a) show that, if cooperation among different suppliers 
of inputs is necessary and all suppliers benefit from the firm doing well, then a good equilibrium with 
no external governance is possible, as internal, mutual monitoring can ensure the optimal outcome.  
AQQ (2005a) and ACDQQ (2008) present evidence on the importance of trade credits as a form of 
financing for firms in the Hybrid Sector.  Cooperation and mutual monitoring can ensure payments 
(as long as funds are available) among business partners despite the lack of external monitoring and 
contract enforcement.  The importance of trade credits is also found in other emerging economies 
(e.g., ACDQQ (2012) on India) as well as in developed countries (Burkart et el. (2007) on the U.S.).   
It is worth mentioning how entrepreneurs and investors alleviate and overcome problems 
associated with government corruption.  According to proponents of institutional development (e.g., 
Rajan and Zingales 2003b; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), poor institutions, weak government and 
powerful elites can severely hinder China’s long-run economic growth.  However, our evidence 
shows that corruption has not prevented a high rate of growth for China’s firms, in particular, firms in 
the Hybrid Sector, where legal protection is perhaps weaker and problems of corruption worse 
compared to firms in the State and Listed sectors.   
                                                           
37 Interestingly, the same survey, used in LLSV (1997b), finds that Chinese citizens have a low tendency to participate in 
civil activities.  However, our evidence shows that, with effective alternative mechanisms in place citizens in the 
developed regions of China have a strong incentive to participate in business/economic activities.   46
A potentially effective solution for corruption is competition among local 
governments/bureaucrats from different regions within the same country.  Entrepreneurs can move 
from region to region to find the most supportive government officials for their private firms, which 
in turn motivates officials to lend “helping hands” rather than “grabbing hands” in the provision of 
public goods or services (e.g., granting of licenses to start-up firms), or else there will be an outflow 
of profitable private businesses from the region (Allen and Qian 2009).  This remedy is typically 
available in a large country with diverse regions like China.  Complementing this view, Xu (2009) 
reviews China’s unique institutional foundation of “regionally decentralized authoritarian system,” in 
which the sub-national governments have considerable autonomous power over regional economic 
decisions and at the same time remain under the control of the central government.  Under this 
structure, local governments play a major role in supporting TVEs, allocating bank credits to firms, 
choosing good firms to get listed.  This system alleviates the information problem that regulators face, 
and creates incentives for sub-national governors though personnel control and regional competition.  
Xu argues that this governance structure is responsible for the spectacular economic growth of China, 
despite weak enforcement of formal laws.   
To summarize, the extraordinary economic performance of China in recent decades, 
especially that of the Hybrid Sector, raises questions about the conventional wisdom of using the 
legal system as the basis of commerce.  Most observers would characterize the economic 
performance in China and India as ‘successful despite the lack of western-style institutions,’ and the 
failure to adopt western institutions will be one of the main factors to halt the long-run economic 
growth.  By contrast, Allen and Qian (2010) argue that China’s economy has been successful because 
of this lack of western-style institutions – in that conducting business outside the legal system in fast-
growing economies such as China can actually be superior to using the law as the basis for finance 
and commerce.   
Focusing on dispute resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms based on the law and 
courts vs. alternative mechanisms operating outside the legal system, Allen and Qian (2010) argue 
that despite many well-known advantages, there are disadvantages in using legal institutions.  First, 
recent research on political economy factors, and in particular, work by Rajan and Zingales (2003a,b) 
shows that rent-seeking behaviors by vested interest groups can turn legal institutions into barriers to 
changes.  We expect these problems to be much more severe in developing countries and the costs of   47
building good institutions can be enormous.
38  One way to solve this problem is not to use the law as 
the basis for commerce but instead to use alternative mechanisms outside the legal system.  Evidence 
presented in this chapter and other related work on China and other emerging economies (e.g., 
ACDQQ (2012) on India) suggests that these alternative mechanisms can be quite effective.   
Second, in democracies there can be a lengthy political process before significant changes can 
be approved (by the majority of the population and/or legislature), and the people in charge of 
revising the law (e.g., politicians and judges) may lack the expertise of business transactions and have 
limited capacity (time and effort) to examine the proposed changes.
39  In the context of a fast-
growing economy with frequent changes such as China, Allen and Qian (2010) show that there is an 
additional advantage of using alternative institutions because this type of system can adapt and 
change much more quickly than when the law is used.  In particular, competition can ensure the most 
efficient mechanism prevails and this process does not require persuading the legislature and the 
electorate to revise the law when circumstances change. 
To conclude, we argue that while legal institutions along with formal financing channels are 
an integral part of developed economies’ institutions, alternative mechanisms and financing channels 
play a much more prominent role in emerging economies, and can be superior to legal mechanisms in 
supporting business transactions in certain industries or entire economies.  Therefore, the 
development of alternative dispute resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms alongside the 
development of legal and other formal institutions can promote a broader base of economic growth 
that is also more sustainable in emerging economies.  The coexistence of and competition between 
alternative and legal mechanisms can also exert positive impact on the development of legal 
institutions, so that they are less likely to be captured by interest groups and become more efficient in 
adapting to changes.   
 
                                                           
38 A frequently talked about and controversial topic is intellectual property rights including patents and copyrights.  The 
practice of enforcing intellectual property rights by courts is much more vigilant and prevalent in developed countries 
than in developing countries such as China. An extensive literature in economics has found mixed evidence on the 
relationship between patent/copyright protection and the pace of innovations. While exclusive property rights provide 
strong incentives for innovations and do lead to more innovations in a few industries such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, excessive protection deters competition, which is another important factor in spurring innovations. 
39 A good example is the U.S. payment system. At the beginning of the 21
st Century the U.S. had a 19
th Century system: 
Checks had to be physically transported from where they were deposited to a central operations center, then to the clearer 
and then back to the banks they were drawn on. Despite repeated calls for changes from the banks and businesses, the U.S 
Congress did not act on this simple yet costly problem, until after September 11, 2001. After the terrorist attack all 
commercial flights were grounded for several days, completely halting the check clearing process. The Check Clearing 
for the 21
st Century Act was signed in October 2003, allowing electronic images to be a substitute for the original checks, 
and thus the clearing process is no longer dependent on the mail and transportation system.   48
VI. Financial Crises 
  Financial crises often accompany the development of a financial system.  Conventional 
wisdom says that financial crises are bad.  Often they are very bad, as they disrupt production and 
lower social welfare as in the Great Depression in the U.S.  Hoggarth et al. (2002) carefully measure 
the costs of a wide range of recent financial crises and find that these costs are on average roughly 
15-20 percent of GDP.  It is these large costs that make policymakers so averse to financial crises.  
It is worthwhile to point out, however, that financial crises may be welfare improving for an 
economy.  One possible example is the late nineteenth century U.S., which experienced many crises 
but at the same time had a high long run growth rate.  In fact, Ranciere et al. (2003) report an 
empirical observation that countries which have experienced occasional crises have grown on 
average faster than countries without crises.  They develop an endogenous growth model and show 
theoretically that an economy may be able to attain higher growth when firms are encouraged by a 
limited bailout policy to take more credit risk in the form of currency mismatch, even though the 
country may experience occasional crises (see Allen and Oura (2004) for a review of the growth and 
crises literature, Allen and Gale (2004a) who show that crises can be optimal and Allen and Gale 
(2007) for a review of the crises literature).  
In this section, we consider financial crises in China.  Given China’s current situation with 
limited currency mismatches any crisis that occurs is likely to be a classic banking, currency or twin 
crisis.  It is perhaps more likely to be of the damaging type that disrupts the economy and social 
stability than of the more benign type that aids growth.  The desirability of preventing crises thus 
needs to be taken into account when considering reforms of China’s financial system.  First, we 
examine how China can prevent traditional financial crises, including a banking sector crisis and a 
stock market or real estate crisis/crash.  We then discuss the impact of different types of financial 
crises, such as the “twin crises” (simultaneous foreign exchange and banking/stock market crises) 
that occurred in many Asian economies in the late 1990s, on China. 
VI.1 Banking Crises and Market Crashes 
Among traditional financial crises, banking panics, arising from the banks’ lack of liquid 
assets to meet total withdrawal demands (anticipated and unanticipated), were often particularly 
disruptive.  Over time one of the most critical roles of central banks came to be the elimination of 
banking panics and the maintenance of financial stability.  To a large degree central banks in different 
countries performed well in this regard in the period following the Second World War.  However, in 
recent years, banking crises are often preceded by abnormal price rises (“bubbles”) in the real estate   49
and/or stock markets.  At some point the bubble bursts and assets markets collapse.  In many cases 
banks and other intermediaries are overexposed to the equity and real estate markets, and following 
the collapse of asset markets a banking crisis ensues.  Allen and Gale (2000c) provide a theory of 
bubbles and crises based on the existence of an agency problem.  Many investors in real estate and 
stock markets obtain their investment funds from external sources.  If the providers of the funds are 
unable to observe the characteristics of the investment, and because of the investors’ limited liability, 
there is a classic risk-shifting problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Risk shifting increases the return 
to risky assets and causes investors to bid up asset prices above their fundamental values.  A crucial 
determinant for asset prices is the amount of credit that is provided for speculative investment.  
Financial liberalization, by expanding the volume of credit, can interact with the agency problem and 
lead to a bubble in asset prices. 
As discussed above in Section III, if NPLs continue to accumulate and/or if growth slows 
significantly then there may be a banking crisis in China.  This may involve withdrawal of funds 
from banks.  However, given the government’s strong position regarding the low level of debt (Table 
3-A), it is feasible for the government to prevent this situation from getting out of control.  Since the 
real estate markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen (largest volume and most developed) and other major 
cities have already experienced bubbles and crashes (see China Industry Report, 
http://www.cei.gov.cn, http://house.focus.cn and Cao (2008) for more details), it is quite possible that 
similar episodes in the future could cause a banking crisis that will be more damaging to the real 
economy.  With booming real estate markets, there will be more speculative money poured into 
properties with a large amount coming from banks.  The agency problem in real estate lending and 
investment mentioned above worsens this problem.  If the real estate market falls significantly within 
a short period of time, defaults on bank loans could be large enough to trigger a banking panic and 
crisis.  The size of the stock market during the first decade of its existence was small relative to the 
banking sector and the overall economy, and hence a crash in the market could hardly put a dent in 
the real economy.  However, given the quick growth of the stock market (as shown in Table 5-A) and 
the fact large and small investors may borrow (from banks) to finance their investment, especially 
during a bubble period, a future market crash could have much more serious consequences.  Overall, 
a banking crisis triggered by crashes in the real estate and/or stock markets represents the most 
serious risk of a financial crisis in China. 
Having said that, we also want to point out that the Chinese government has maintained 
strong control over the big banks through their (nontradable) shareholdings.  While government   50
control may have a negative effect in more developed countries in terms of efficiency, it may be 
beneficial in countries with less developed financial markets.  In particular, the government can help 
to control the risk taking behaviors of the banks by regulations and direct interventions as a 
shareholder.  Moreover, in the case of a crisis, the government has the ability to speed up the 
recovery and maintain the stability of the market by loan expansion if it has control over major banks.  
In fact, the Chinese banking sector and financial markets were not affected much by the 2007-2009 
global financial crisis. Though we recognized earlier in the paper that government’s dual roles as 
regulator and as majority owner can be problematic, this can also be beneficial both in terms of 
preventing and coping with a crisis.  
 
VI.2 Capital Account Liberalization, Sterilization, Twin Crises and Contagion 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, a different breed of 
financial crisis emerged.  Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) found that three quarters of the IMF’s 
member countries suffered some form of banking crisis between 1980 and 1996, and their study did 
not include the subsequent Asian financial crisis in 1997.  In many of these crises, banking panics in 
the traditional sense were avoided either by central bank intervention or by explicit or implicit 
government guarantees.  But as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find, the advent of financial 
liberalization in many economies in the 1980s, in which free capital in- and out-flows and the 
entrance and competition from foreign investors and financial institutions follow in the home 
country, has often led to “twin” banking and currency crises.  A common precursor to these crises 
was financial liberalization and significant credit expansion and subsequent stock market crashes and 
banking crises.  In emerging markets this is often then accompanied by an exchange rate crisis as 
governments choose between lowering interest rates to ease the banking crises or raising them to 
defend the home currency.  Finally, a significant fall in output occurs and the economies enter 
recessions.  
Liberalization of the Capital Account and Financial Sector 
Capital account liberation can attract more foreign capital, but large scale and sudden capital 
flows and foreign speculation significantly increase the likelihood of a twin crisis.  The first key 
question is, when and to what extent a country opens its capital account and financial sector to 
foreign capital and foreign financial institutions?   With a model of endogenous financial 
intermediation, Alessandria and Qian (2005) demonstrate that an efficient financial sector prior to 
liberalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful financial liberalization.  Applying   51
these ideas to China, even though the overall efficiency of China’s banking sector (especially state-
owned banks) is still low compared to international standards, banks can have a stronger incentive to 
limit the moral hazard concerning borrowers’ choices of investment projects through monitoring and 
designing of loan contracts (e.g., adjusting interest rates and/or maturities) following a capital 
account liberalization.  Therefore, the efficiency of the banking sector improves and the liberalization 
can generate a large welfare increase, since it leads to both a larger scale of investment and a better 
composition of investment projects.  This is more likely to occur with low interest rates in 
international markets (so that cost of capital for domestic banks is also low).  A financial sector 
liberalization, which allows foreign financial institutions to enter China’s lending markets, can 
further improve welfare as more competition provides stronger incentives for all banks to further 
discourage moral hazard in investment.   
Sterilization of Foreign Currency Reserves 
China has experienced a large increase in its foreign exchange reserves since 2001, due to a 
continuous inflow of capital and the commitment to maintain a fixed rate against the US dollar 
initially and then a crawling peg exchange rate regime after 2005.  The RMB kept appreciating 
against US dollar until mid 2008, when the exchange rate stayed flat again at around 6.83 RMB/US$.  
It resumed the path of appreciation in June 2010 and the exchange rate further dropped to 6.5 
RMB/US by April 2011.  Figure 8-A plots monthly foreign reserves as shown on the balance sheet of 
the PBOC; a clear trend emerges as the reserves increased rapidly since 2003.
40  On the balance of 
payments side, the current account surplus grew from $37 billion in 1997 to $305.4 billion in 2010; 
net export grew from 2.5% of GDP in 2004 to 8% of GDP in 2008 and then dropped to 3.1% in 2010 
due to a decrease in net exports. The capital account was mostly positive during the period 1995 to 
2009, implying a net capital inflow.  The current account surplus has come mainly from trade 
surpluses, while the capital account surplus mainly comes from FDI.  It has long been recognized that 
a large stock of foreign reserves has both pros and cons.  Abundant foreign reserves enable a country 
to maintain a stable exchange rate and to meet its foreign debt obligations.  It can also be used to 
cushion the sudden shocks on a country’s current and capital accounts.  However, an increase in 
foreign exchange reserves leads to an accumulation of foreign assets, a component of the monetary 
base.  Thus an increase in foreign reserves, ceteris paribus, causes monetary expansion and puts 
inflationary pressures on the economy, resulting in an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  This 
                                                           
40 The PBOC has made use of its foreign reserves in ways other than investing in low risk assets such as long term 
government bonds.  As discussed above, some foreign reserves were used to recapitalize the large state owned financial 
institutions.   52
experience is not unique for China.  Many East Asian countries have experienced similar problems 
induced by large (private) capital inflows starting in the late 1980s.   
Insert Figures 8-A and 8-B here. 
To offset the expansionary effect of the increasing foreign reserves, the central bank can 
sterilize the foreign assets by taking opposite actions with domestic assets, or implement other 
contractionary monetary policies.  In China’s case, the major sterilization tools are open market 
operations (OMO) and raising required reserve ratios.  These two methods affect the liability side of 
the central bank’s balance sheet in a similar way.  Generally the cost of sterilization using required 
reserves is lower than open market operations, since the central bank pays minimal interest on 
required and excess reserves.  OMOs in China mainly include central bank bill issuance and short 
term repurchases operations (repos, usually within 91 days).  Since February 2003, the central bank 
has engaged in two or more OMOs each week.  The total PBOC bonds outstanding as percentage of 
foreign reserves has been increasing consistently from 2000 to 2010, implying an increasing trend in 
sterilization.
41   
Moreover, China has been gradually raising the required reserve ratios since the third quarter 
of 2003, corresponding to an increase in foreign reserves inflows.  The required reserve ratio rose 
from 6% to 21.5% in June 2011, an historical high.  Since Chinese commercial banks tend to 
maintain a high excess reserve ratio due to a lack of alternative investment channels, the PBOC has 
decreased the interest rate on excess reserves from 1.62% in 2003 to 0.72% in 2008 to discourage the 
hoarding of excess reserves.  To make sterilization effective, China also has to impose tight capital 
controls.  As the famous “trilemma” implicates, with a fixed exchange rate and free capital flows, the 
sterilization process will be immediately offset by further capital inflows.  Though it has been 
documented that capital controls in China are somewhat porous (Prasad and Wei (2005)), it is still 
widely believed that China has successfully sterilized at least some of its rising foreign reserves (e.g., 
Prasad and Goodfriend (2006), Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2007), He. at el. (2005)).  Moreover, due 
to a combination of rapid increases in foreign reserves and low interest rates on domestic bonds, the 
PBOC’s income from foreign reserve investment is likely to exceed the sterilization cost stemming 
from central bank bill issuance and high required reserve ratios, enabling China to carry out 
sterilization to a large extent.  Nevertheless, possible appreciation of the RMB may have a profound 
negative impact on the PBOC’s income from foreign reserves in domestic currency terms. 
                                                           
41 There are also non-market tools such as transferring the deposits from the commercial banking system to the central 
bank.  In recent years, the PBOC also started making foreign exchange swaps with big commercial banks as a tool for 
controlling liquidity.   53
Currency Crisis and Banking Crisis (A Twin Crisis) 
  A currency crisis that may trigger a banking crisis is a possibility.  The rapid increase in 
foreign exchange reserves in recent years suggests there is a lot of speculative money in China in 
anticipation of an RMB revaluation.  If there is a significant future revaluation or if after some time it 
becomes clear there will not be one then much of this money may be withdrawn.  What happens then 
will depend on how the government and central bank respond.  If they allow the currency to float so 
they do not use up the exchange reserves then any falls in the value of the RMB may occur quickly 
and this may limit further outflows.  If they try to limit the exchange rate movement then there may 
be a classic currency crisis.  This is in turn may trigger a banking crisis if there are large withdrawals 
from banks as a result.  Quickly adopting a full float can help to avoid a twin crisis, and thus reduce 
the overall economic costs of the currency crisis.
42 
Financial Contagion 
Another phenomenon that has been present in many recent crises (e.g., the 1997 Asian crisis) 
is that financial crises are contagious.  A small shock that initially affects only a particular region or 
sector can spread by contagion within the banking system or asset markets to the rest of the financial 
sector, then to the entire economy and possibly other economies.  Contagion can occur in a number of 
ways.  In the Chinese context with tight capital control and where financial markets are relatively 
unimportant it is most likely they will occur either from contractually interconnected financial 
institutions or large asset price movements that cause spillovers to financial institutions.   
Allen and Gale (2000d) focus on the channel of contagion that arises from the overlapping 
claims that different regions or sectors of the banking system have on one another through interbank 
markets.  When one region suffers a banking crisis, the other regions suffer a loss because their 
claims on the troubled region fall in value.  If this spillover effect is strong enough, it can cause a 
crisis in the adjacent regions, and a contagion can occur which brings down the entire financial 
system.  Allen and Gale (2004b) show how large price falls can come about as a result of forced 
liquidations when there is a limited supply of liquidity in the market.  Cifuentes et al. (2005) show 
that contagion is likely to be particularly severe when these two factors interact. 
Insert Table 7 here. 
                                                           
42 Chang and Velasco (2001) develop a model of twin crises based on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of bank 
runs.  Money enters agents’ utility function, and the central bank controls the ratio of currency to consumption.  In some 
regimes, there exists both a “good” equilibrium in which early (late) consumers receive the proceeds from short-term 
(long-term) assets, and a “bad” equilibrium in which everybody believes a crisis will occur and these beliefs are self-
fulfilling.  If the bad equilibrium occurs, there is a twin crisis.   54
Given China’s current financial system, what is the likelihood of financial contagion caused 
by contractual interlinkages as in the interbank market or because of a meltdown in asset prices if 
there are forced sales?  China’s interbank market grew very quickly since its inception in 1981; in 
fact, the growth of this market was so fast, with the participation of many unregulated financial 
institutions and with large amount of flows of funds through this market to fixed asset investment, 
that it exacerbated high inflation in the late 1980s.  Since then the government and PBOC increased 
their regulation by limiting participation of non-bank financial institutions and by imposing 
restrictions on interest rate movements.  In 1996 a nation-wide, uniform system of interbank markets 
was set up.  It contains two connected levels: the primary network, which includes the largest PBOC 
branches, large commercial banks, and a few large non-bank financial institutions, and the secondary 
network that includes many banks and non-bank institutions and their local branches (see China 
Interbank Market Annual Reports for more details).  Table 7 documents the growth of the interbank 
market during 2001-2010: while the trading volume of long maturity contracts (20 days or longer) is 
low, the volume of short-term contracts (overnight and week-long) has been high (reaching RMB 10 
trillion to 20 trillion, or $1.5 billion to $2.9 billion).  Therefore, the increasing interlinkages can 
potentially create a contagion if a crisis develops in one area or sector.   
With regard to a meltdown of asset prices, this can happen because of a limited supply of 
liquidity if there is a rapid liquidation of assets.  It seems unlikely that this can occur and cause a 
serious problem in China’s securities markets.  A more serious threat is real estate markets if there 
are bankruptcies and forced selling.  This could potentially interact with bank interlinkages and cause 
a systemic problem.  As mentioned above, a crash in real estate and/or stock markets could quite 
possibly be the cause of a financial crisis in China. 
 
VII. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
  One of the most frequently asked questions about China’s financial system is whether it will 
stimulate or hamper its economic growth.  Our answer to this question, based on examining the 
history and current status of the financial system and comparing them to those of other countries, is in 
four parts.  First, the large banking sector dominated by state-owned banks has played a much more 
important role in funding the growth of many types of firms than financial markets.  While the 
problem of NPLs has been under control in recent years, continuing the improvement of the 
efficiency of major banks toward international standards will allow growth to continue.  Second, the 
stock market has been growing fast since 1990, but has played a relatively limited role in supporting   55
the growth of the economy.  However, with rapid growth that is likely to be sustained in the near 
future the role of the financial markets in the economy will become increasingly more significant.     
  If we can summarize that the role of the banking sector and financial markets has been that 
they have done enough not to slow down the growth of the economy, our third conclusion is that 
alternative financing channels have had great success in supporting the growth of the Hybrid Sector, 
which contributes most of the economic growth compared to the State and Listed Sectors.  The non-
standard financial sector relies on alternative financing channels including internal finance, and on 
alternative governance mechanisms, such as those based on trust, reputation and relationships, and 
competition in output and input markets to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.  It is possible 
that these alternative institutions are superior to western-style legal institutions in supporting a fast-
growing economy such as China’s.    
We conclude by pointing out that economic stability is crucial for the continuing development 
of the Chinese economy, and the stability of the financial system relates to economic stability in three 
dimensions.  The continuing effort by banks to reduce NPLs and improve efficiency can help to avoid 
a banking crisis, while the efforts to improve the regulatory environment surrounding the financial 
markets (including governance and accounting standards) can help to prevent a crash/crisis in the 
stock and/or real estate markets.  If China further opens the capital account, there will be a large 
inflow of foreign capital, but large scale capital flows and speculations also bring the risk of a twin 
crisis (foreign exchange and banking/stock market crisis), which severely damaged emerging 
economies in Asia in 1997.     56
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Table 1  Comparing financial systems: Banks and Markets (average 2001-2007) 
 
This table compares financial markets and banking sector of China with those of other large emerging economies. All the 
measures on the size and efficiency of banks and markets are based on Levine (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2001), and data is from the World Bank Financial Database.  We present the 2001-2007 average figures for all countries 
(except for “Structure Regulatory,” which are based on 2005 figures). Average of other emerging economies are (simple) 
averages across other emerging economies excluding China.  
 
   Size of Banks and Markets  Structure Indices:  Markets vs. banks
*  Financial Development
** 




























China 1.16  0.16  0.62  0.64  -0.62 8.88  2.32  16  8.88  8.91  5.97 
Argentina   0.14  0.10  0.04  0.48  -1.32 3.93  1.59  7  3.93  6.50  3.60 
Brazil   0.34  0.04  0.19  0.53  -0.61 6.45  0.72  10  6.45  7.49  6.17 
Egypt   0.52  0.21  0.19  0.60  -1.02 6.88  2.54  13  6.88  8.04  4.48 
India 0.37  0.07  0.57  0.64  0.44 7.65  1.50  10  7.65  7.76  6.71 
Indonesia 0.24  0.12  0.12  0.28  -0.69 5.66  1.23  Na  5.66  6.51  4.60 
Malaysia   1.15  0.12  0.43  1.45  -0.98 8.51  2.85  10  8.51  9.72  5.89 
Mexico 0.18  0.03  0.06  0.26  -0.99 4.74 -0.26  12  4.74  6.11  5.38 
Pakistan   0.26  0.14  0.72  0.28  1.01 7.55  1.36  10  7.55  6.61  6.26 
Peru   0.21  0.08  0.03  0.44  -1.96 4.10  1.22  8  4.10  6.81  3.63 
Philippines   0.34  0.15 0.07 0.47  -1.54 5.50  1.97  7  5.50  7.36  3.85 
Russian   0.26  0.04  0.27  0.65  0.06 6.54  0.96  n/a  6.54  7.41  6.52 
S. Africa   1.38  0.02  0.88  2.06  -0.45 9.40  1.43  8  9.40  10.25  8.38 
Sri Lanka  0.31  0.15  0.03  0.18  -2.33 4.52  1.00  7  4.52  6.31  2.97 
Thailand   1.02  0.11  0.50  0.63  -0.72 8.52  1.95  9  8.52  8.77  6.10 
Turkey   0.20  0.10  0.39  0.28  0.67 6.65  1.05  12  6.65  6.32  5.93 
Ave. for 
EMs  0.46   0.10  0.30   0.62   -0.70  6.44  1.41  9.46   6.44   7.46  5.36 
 
Notes: 
*: Structure indices measure whether a country’s financial system is market- or bank-dominated; the higher the measure, 
the more the system is dominated by markets. Specifically, “structure activity” is equal to log(value traded/bank credit) and 
measures size of bank credit relative to trading volume of markets; “structure size” is equal to log(market cap/bank credit) and 
measures the size of markets relative to banks; “structure efficiency” is equal to log(market cap ratio×bank NPL ratio) and 
measures the relative efficiency of markets vs. banks; finally, “structure regulatory” is the sum of the four categories in 
regulatory restriction, or the degree to which commercial banks are allowed to engage in security, firm operation, insurance, and 
real estate: 1- unrestricted; 2-permit to conduct through subsidiary; 3-full range not permitted in subsidiaries; and 4-strictly 
prohibited. 
**: Financial development variables measure the entire financial system (banking and market sectors combined), and the 
higher the measure, the larger or more efficient the financial system is.  Specifically, “finance activity” is equal to log (total 
value traded ratio×private credit ratio), “finance size” is equal to log (market cap ratio×bank private credit ratio), and “finance 
efficiency” is equal to log (total value traded ratio/bank NPL ratio). 
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Table 2-A  Comparisons of Total Savings and Deposits (in US$ billions) 
 
    1998  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006  2007 2008 2009
China 
Demand deposits
a  320 391 465 533  647  777  899  1030  1265  1671 1931 2683 
Savings deposits
b  606 674 722 820  961  1143 1445  1748  2069  2363 3187 3811 
Time deposits
c  100 114 136 171  199  253  307 410  676  878  1205 1661 
Time  &  Savings  Dep/GDP  68%  73%  72% 75% 80% 85% 91%  95%  101%  92% 100% 114%
Japan 
Demand deposits
a  1793  2259  2073 1838 2567 3523 3795  3541  3523  3683 4560 - 
Time, savings & foreign 
currency deposits  7921  8997  8059 5351 5383 5416 5448  4642  4536  4778 6160 - 
Time  &  Savings  Dep/GDP  181%  185%  184% 142% 131% 118% 114%  109%  106%  106% 110% - 
South Korea 
Demand deposits
a  18 22 23 27  36  38  46 54  67  66  50  63 
Time, savings & foreign 
currency deposits 
185 251 289 315  383  410  467 485  546  543  471  574 
Time  &  Savings  Dep/GDP  46%  54%  61% 64% 63% 64% 58%  57%  56%  52% 58% 63%
India 
Demand deposits
a  24 28 31 32  35  44  60 71  89  114  96 119 
Time, savings & foreign 
currency deposits 
140 161 175 198  235  277  333 368  460  647  653  800 
Time  &  Savings  Dep/GDP  34%  36%  39% 42% 46% 46% 46%  46%  49%  54% 59% 60%
 
Source: IMF and CEIC database  
Notes: 
a: Demand deposits, balance of the accounts can be withdrawn on demand of customers (e.g., check-writing); 
b: 
Savings deposits, interest-bearing accounts that can be withdraw but cannot use as Money (e.g., no checking writing); 
c: 
Time deposits, savings accounts or CD with a fixed term. 
 
Table 2-B  Breakdown of Bank Loans (end-of-year figures in RMB billions) 
 



























1994 3,997.60  2,694.87 994.83  1,050.98 61.72  114.39  200.24  15.59  79.23 
1995 5,054.41  3,337.20  1,177.47  1,283.71 79.93  154.48  251.49  19.62  99.91 
1996 6,115.66  4,021.00  1,421.33  1,533.26 97.38  191.91  282.19  27.98  134.63 
1997 7,491.41  5,541.83  1,652.66  1,835.66 159.11  331.46  503.58  38.67  189.10 
1998 8,652.41  6,061.32  1,782.15  1,975.24 162.87  444.42  558.00  47.16  248.75 
1999 9,373.43  6,388.76  1,794.89  1,989.09 147.69  479.24  616.13  57.91  298.58 
2000 9,937.11  6,574.81  1,701.93  1,786.85 161.71  488.90  606.08  65.46  304.98 
2001 11,231.47  6,732.72 1,863.67  1,856.34 209.96  571.15  641.30  91.80  326.35 
2002 13,129.39  7,424.79 2,019.05  1,797.31 274.80  688.46  681.23  105.88  269.74 
2003 15,899.62  8,366.12 2,275.60  1,799.44 300.21  841.14  766.16  146.16  256.94 
2004 17,819.78  8,684.06 2,389.66  1,707.41 278.01  984.31  806.92  208.16  219.84 










































Source: Statistical Yearbooks of China, CEIC database (1985 – 2009). 64 
 
Table 3-A  A Comparison of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) and Government Debt 
 
        This table compares total outstanding NPLs within the banking system, government debt, and the ratio of (NPLs + 
Government Debt)/GDP among China, the U.S., and other major Asian countries for the period 1997-2006.  Panel A presents 
the size of the NPLs, as measured by US$ billion and as the percentage of GDPs in the same year.  NPLs in the U.S. measure 
the outstanding “delinquency loan”; NPLs in Japan measure the “risk management loans” (or loans disclosed under the 
Financial Reconstructed Law and/or loans subject to self-assessment).  In Panel B, outstanding government debt is measured at 
the end of each year; for the U.S. and Japan, total government debt includes domestic and foreign debt.  In Panel C, the ratios 
for China include using the official NPL numbers and using doubled official NPLs (i.e., the ratios in the brackets are (doubled 
NPLs + government debt)/GDP); the ratios in the brackets for the U.S. and Japan are (net government debt + NPLs)/GDP, 
where net government debt is the difference between government borrowing (stock measure) and government lending (flow 
measure).  All figures are converted into U.S. dollars using the average exchange rate within the observation year. 
 
Year   China   U.S.   Japan  Korea  India   Indonesia   Taiwan
Panel A: Size of NPLs: In US$ billion and as percentage of GDPs in the same year (in brackets) 
    -- 66.9 (0.8%) 217.4 (5.1%) 16.2 (3.1%) -- 0.2 (0.1%) 19.6 (6.5%)
1998 20.5 (2.0%) 71.3 (0.8%) 489.7 (12.7%) 23.2 (6.7%) 12.7 (3.1%) 5.5 (5.2%) 21.8 (7.9%)
1999 105.1 (9.7%) 72.2 (0.8%) 547.6 (12.6%) 54.4 (12.2%) 14.0 (3.2%) 3.2 (3.8%) 27.2 (9.1%)
2000 269.3 (22.5%) 90.1 (0.9%) 515.4 (11.1%) 35.5 (6.9%) 12.9 (2.8%) 6.3 (2.7%) 33.2 (10.3%)
2001 265.3 (20.0%) 108.4 (1.1%) 640.1 (15.6%) 12.2 (2.5%) 13.2 (2.8%) 4.3 (1.7%) 37.9 (13.0%)
2002 188.4 (13.0%) 107.8 (1.0%) 552.5 (14.1%) 9.9 (1.8%) 14.8 (3.0%) 3.3 (2.0%) 30.7 (10.4%)
2003 181.2 (11.0%) 95.9 (1.0%) 480.1 (11.3%) 11.7 (1.9%) 14.6 (2.5%) 4.7 (1.5%) 23.1 (7.7%)
2004  207.4 (10.7%) 81.3 (0.9%) 334.8 (7.3%) 10.0 (1.5%) 14.4 (2.2%) 3.8 (2.1%) 26.4 (5.1%)
2005 164.2 (7.3%) 84.6 (0.7%) 183.3 (4.0%) 7.6 (1.0%) 13.4 (1.7%) 6.0 (1.5%) 11.2 (3.2%)
2006  157.4 (5.9%) 103.8 (0.8%) 157.8 (3.6%) 8.2 (0.9%) 11.2 (1.3%) 5.2 (1.4%) 11.3  3.1%
2007  166.8 (5.1%) 168.1 (1.2%) 148.6 (3.4%) 8.3 (0.8%) 13.6 (1.2%) 4.5 (1.0%) 10.0  2.6%
2008 80.6  (1.9%) 328.7  (2.3%) 190.8 (3.7%) 13.0 (1.4%) 15.4 (1.3%) 4.3 (0.8%) 9.0  2.3%
2009 72.6  (1.5%) 477.5 (3.3%) 188.45 (3.63%) 13.9 (1.5%) 18.2 (1.3%) 4.6 (1.0%) 6.7 (1.8%)
2010 68.1  (1.1%) 423.4  (2.9%) 208.70 (3.82%) 26.8 (2.6% 20.7 (1.2%) 4.3 (0.6%) 3.8 (0.9%)






















1997    66.5   5,802.8   4,254.0   5.3  --         
1998    93.8   5,788.8   4,858.0   14.4  178.4        
1999    127.3   5,822.7   6,053.1   28.5  260.2   34.1   46.5 
2000    165.1   5,612.7   6,209.8   32.7  232.4   45.1   45.5 
2001    188.6   5,734.4   6,036.0   39.8  225.4   43.5   58.7 
2002    233.5   6,169.4   6,321.3   45.2  250.2   42.1   77.7 
2003    273.0   6,789.7   6,852.9   67.9  259.7   48.0   75.7 
2004    311.3   7,335.6   7,446.6   107.0  299.6   44.7   85.2 
2005    350.0   7,809.5   8,299.5   165.5  347.1   39.9   86.7 
2006    364.6   8,451.4   7,587.1   216.7  375.2   45.7   85.8 
2007    599.8   8,950.7   7,707.7   245.0  472.0   51.8   94.5 
2008    701.6   9,985.8   8,966.2   217.8  496.4   52.8   90.4 
2009   753.6  12,867.5    9,466.8    290.9  556.6   52.5   82.9
2010    805.3 14,551.8 11,284.9    364.0  643.6   68.4   102.0 
Panel C: (NPLs + Outstanding Government Debt)/GDP 
      -- 0.71 (0.54) 1.05 (0.40) 0.04  -- -- --
1998  0.11 0.67 (0.50) 1.39 (0.63) 0.11  0.46  -- --65 
 
1999  0.21 0.64 (0.45) 1.51 (0.64) 0.19 0.62  0.24  0.25 
2000  0.36 0.58 (0.40) 1.45 (0.65) 0.13 0.53  0.31  0.24 
2001  0.34 0.58 (0.39) 1.63 (0.83) 0.11 0.50  0.30  0.33 
2002  0.29 0.60 (0.42) 1.76 (0.90) 0.10 0.54  0.23  0.37 
2003  0.28 0.63 (0.45) 1.73 (0.86) 0.13 0.48  0.22  0.33 
2004  0.27 0.63 (0.46) 1.70 (0.81) 0.17 0.47  0.19  0.32 
2005  0.23 0.63 (0.47) 1.86 (0.84) 0.22 0.47  0.16  0.27 
2006  0.20 0.65 (0.44)  1.78 (0.88) 0.24 0.44  0.14  0.26 
2007  0.23 0.66 (0.45)  1.79 (0.89) 0.24 0.44  0.13  0.27 
2008 0.18 0.72 (0.50) 1.78 (0.88) 0.25 0.42 0.11 0.25
2009 0.17 0.94 (0.46) 1.55 (1.15) 0.24 0.58 0.11 0.24
2010 0.21 1.01 (0.70) 1.94 (1.20) 0.33 0.45 0.10 0.25
 
Sources: Statistical Bureau of China, the People’s Bank of China, Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission; Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve Bank, Statistical Abstracts of the U.S., the Statistical Bureau of Japan; Ministry of Finance, Korea, the Bank of 
Korea, Korean Statistical Information System; IMF, World Bank; Bank Indonesia; Ministry of Finance, India; National Statistical 
Bureau of Taiwan, Bloomberg, Chinabond, and Taiwan financial supervisory commission. 
 
Table 3-B  Liquidation of NPLs by Four Asset Management Companies (RMB billion) 
 
This table presents results on the liquidation of NPLs by four state-owned asset management companies in China during 
the period 2001 to the 1
st quarter of 2006.  These asset management companies were set up to specifically deal with NPLs 
accumulated in the ‘Big Four’ state-owned banks. 
 












Hua Rong  23.21  12.54  7.55  54.0  32.5 
Great Wall  53.11  6.30  3.69  11.9  6.9 
Oriental 18.29  8.51  4.42  46.5  24.2 
Xin Da  29.90  22.50  10.49  75.3  35.1 
Total 124.51  49.86  26.15  40.0  21.0 
2002 
Hua Rong  32.04  11.43  10.20  35.7  31.8 
Great Wall  45.48  7.94  5.47  17.5  12.0 
Oriental 22.10  10.60  5.57  47.9  25.2 
Xin Da  33.10  17.46  10.51  52.7  31.8 












Hua Rong  209.54  41.34  59.77  25.29  19.73 
Great Wall  209.91  21.57  61.91  14.43  10.27 
Oriental 104.55  23.29  41.42  29.50  22.27 
Xin Da  151.06  50.81  48.90  38.29  33.64 
Total  675.06 137.00 53.96  25.48  20.29 
2005 
Hua Rong  243.38  54.39  69.17  26.92  22.35 
Great Wall  263.39  27.35  77.88  12.90  10.39 66 
 
Oriental 131.76  32.01  52.08  28.73  24.30 
Xin Da  201.21  62.84  63.82  34.30  31.23 
Total  839.75 176.60 66.74  24.58  21.03 
2006 (Q1) 
Hua Rong  246.80  54.66  70.11  26.50  22.15 
Great Wall  270.78  27.83  80.11  12.70  10.28 
Oriental 141.99  32.81  56.13  27.16  23.11 
Xin Da  206.77  65.26  64.69  34.46  31.56 
Total  866.34 180.56 68.61  24.20  20.84 
 
Notes:   1. Accumulated Disposal refers to the accumulated amount of cash and non-cash assets recovered as well as loss 
incurred by the end of the reporting period.  
2. Disposal Ratio = Accumulated Disposal / Total NPLs purchased . 
3. Asset Recovery Ratio = Total Assets Recovered / Accumulated Disposal. 
4. Cash Recovery Ratio = Cash Recovered / Accumulated Disposal. 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2002-2005, and the reports of China Banking Regulatory Commission 
2004-2009.  
 
Table 4-A  Chinese Banks’ IPOs and Comparison with Other Banks  
 
This table presents information on the IPOs of three of the Big Four banks and that of Bank of Communications 
(BComm).  BOC, ICBC and ABC were listed in both the HKSE (HK dollar) and SHSE (RMB), while PCBC and 
BComm only listed shares on the HKSE.  First day (first week) return is percentage return of closing price of first day 
(fifth trading day) over offer price.  Foreign ownership indicates size of ownership stakes of foreign institutions and 
investors at the date of IPOs.  
  
Panel A Performance of Chinese Banks’ IPOs 
 
  ICBC BOC  PCBC  BComm  ABC* 
















IPO  Date  10/27/2006 10/27/2006 6/01/2006 7/05/2006 10/27/2005 6/23/2005 7/15/2010 7/16/2010 
Offer  Price    3.07  3.12 2.95  3.08 2.35  2.5  3.2 2.68 
Proceeds   124.95B  46.64B 82.86B  20.00B 59.94B 14.64B 93.8B  68.5B 
1
st Day Return  14.66%  5.13%  14.41%  22.73%  0.00%  13.00%  2.2%  1％ 
1
st Week Return  16.94%  4.81%  19.49%  19.16%  -1.06%  13.00%  9.1%  1.9% 
Foreign  Ownership  7.28%  -- 14.40%  -- 14.39%  18.33%  40.8% -- 
 
Source: IPO prospectuses submitted to SHSE and HKSE; SHSE and HKSE. 
*: In USD, ABC raised $22.1 billion from its IPO, beating the record of $21.9 billion from ICBC’s IPO. However in 
terms of RMB, ICBC still holds the record of largest IPO since RMB has appreciated significantly since 2006. 
 
 
Panel B Top 10 Banks Measured by Market Capitalization ($billion) 
 
Rank Bank  Name  HQ 
Country 
Market Cap. $B 
(July. 16
th, 2010) 
Total Return (%) 
YTD 
1  IND & COMM BK   China  214.51 -20.14 
2  CHINA CONST BANK  China  189.04 -1.99 
3  HSBC HLDGS PLC  U.K.  166.51 -15.40 
4  JPMORGAN CHASE  U.S.  155.17 -6.06 
5  BANK OF AMERICA  U.S.  140.26 -7.06 
6  WELLS FARGO & CO  U.S.  136.71 -2.46 
7  BANK OF CHINA  China  130.29 1.71 67 
 
8  AGRICULTURAL BANK  China  128.60 0.4 
9  CITIGROUP INC  US  113.00 17.82 
10  BANCO SANTANDER  Spain  102.77 -21.87 
 
                Source: Bloomberg. 
 
Panel C Top 20 Banks Measured by Total Assets (July 2010; $trillion) 
 
Rank  Bank Name (HQ Country)  HQ Country  Total Assets 
($trillion)
1  BNP PARIBAS  France  2.95 
2  ROYAL BANK SCOTLAN  UK  2.68 
3  HSBC HLDGS PLC  UK  2.36 
4  BANK OF AMERICA  U.S  2.36 
5  DEUTSCHE BANK-RG  Germany  2.26 
6  CREDIT AGRICOLE  France  2.23 
7  BARCLAYS PLC  U.K.  2.23 
8  MITSUBISHI UFJ F  Japan  2.18 
9  JPMORGAN CHASE  U.S.  2.01 
10  CITIGROUP INC  U.S.  1.94 
11  IND & COMM BANK  China  1.73 
12  MIZUHO FINANCIAL  Japan  1.67 
13  LLOYDS BANKING  U.K.  1.66 
14  BANCO SANTANDER  Spain  1.55 
15  CHINA CONST BA-H  China  1.48 
16  SOC GENERALE  France  1.47 
17  SUMITOMO MITSUI  Japan  1.32 
18  AGRICULTURAL BANK  China  1.30 
19  UBS AG-REG  Switzerland  1.29 
20  UNICREDIT SPA  Italy  1.28 
 
Source: Bloomberg (based on latest filings), July 15th, 2010. 
 
Table 4-B  State-owned and Private Banks in China (RMB billion) 
 
Types of Banks  Total Assets   Total Deposits Outstanding  Loans   Profit
1  NPL rate (%) 
2009  
Big Five Banks  40,089.0 29,506.5  20,151.7  400.1  1.8 
Other Commercial Banks  17,465.0 15,041.5  9,606.6     
   1) Joint Equity   11,785.0 10,548.7  6,707.4  92.5  1.0 
   2) City Commercial Banks  5,680.0 4,492.8  2,899.2  49.7  1.3 
Foreign Banks  1,349.2 668.8  727.1  6.5  0.9 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  27.2  39.5   0.2  
Rural Credit Cooperatives   5,492.5 4,742.1  5,421.3  22.8   
2008 
Big Five Banks  31,836.0  23,696.1 15,029.3  354.2 2.8 
Other Commercial Banks  12,941.2  11,072.2  7,162.4     
   1) Joint Equity   8,809.2 7,801.8  5,054.5  84.1  1.3 
   2) City Commercial Banks  4,132.0  3,270.4  2,107.9  40.8  2.3 
Foreign Banks  1,344.8  533.5  762.1  11.9  0.8 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  80.4  76.2    0.62   
Rural Credit Cooperatives   5,211.3 4,173.6  3,753.2  21.9   
200768 
 
Big  Five Banks  28,007.0 20,067.7  13,850.9  246.6  8.05 
Other Commercial Banks  10,589.9  9,023.3  5,684.4     
   1) Joint Equity  7,249.4 6,432.0  4,001.9  56.4  2.15 
   2) City Commercial Banks  3,340.5  2,591.4  1,682.6  24.8  3.04 
Foreign Banks  1,252.5  390.0  700.0  6.1  0.46 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  131.2 134.1  84.7  0.77  
Rural Credit Cooperatives   4,343.4 3,534.9  3,256.1  19.3   
2006 
Big Five Banks  24,236  18,285.1  11,426.2  197.5  9.22 
Other Commercial Banks  8,038.4  7512.8  5526.6     
   1) Joint Equity   5,444.6 5,396.5  4,156.9  43.4  2.81 
   2) City Commercial Banks  2,593.8  2,116.2  1,369.7  18.1  4.78 
Foreign Banks  927.9  244.0  485.9  5.8  0.78 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  183.1 157.9                         100.7   1.0  
Rural Credit Cooperatives   3,450.3 3,040.2  2,747.6  18.6   
2005 
Big Five Banks
2  21,005.0 16,283.8  10,224.0  156.1  10.49 
Other Commercial Banks  6,502.2  6,261.1  4,576.6     
   1) Joint Equity   4,465.5 4,570.0  3,487.7  28.9  4.22 
   2) City Commercial Banks  2,036.7  16,91.2  1,088.9  12.1  7.73 
Foreign Banks  715.5  179.3  363.8  3.7  1.05 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  203.3 181.3  113.1  0.9   
Rural Credit Cooperatives   3,142.7 2,767.4  2,319.9  12.0   
2004 
Big Four Banks  16,932.1  14,412.3 10,086.1  45.9  15.57 
Other Commercial Banks  4,697.2 4,059.9  2,885.9  50.7  4.93 
   1) Joint Equity         17.6  5.01 
   2) City Commercial Banks  1,693.8  1,434.1  904.5  8.5  11.73 
Foreign Banks  515.9  126.4  255.8  18.8  1.34 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  171.5  154.9  97.9  0.4   
Rural Credit Cooperatives   3,101.3 2,734.8  1,974.8  9.65   
2003 
Big Four Banks  16,275.1  13,071.9 9,950.1  196.5  19.74 
Other Commercial Banks    
   1) Joint Equity 
3,816.8 3,286.5  2,368.2   
14.6 
7.92 
6.5   
   2) City Commercial Banks  1,465.4  1,174.7  774.4  5.4  14.94 
Foreign Banks  333.1  90.7  147.6  18.1  2.87 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  148.7  127.1  85.6  0.01   
Rural Credit Cooperatives   2,674.6 2,376.5  1,775.9  4.4   
2002 
Big Four Banks  14,450.0  11,840.0 8,460.0  71.0    26.1 
Other Commercial Banks  4,160.0  3,390.0  2,290.0  --  -- 
   1) Joint Equity  2,990.0  --  --  --  9.5 
   2) City Commercial Banks 1,170.0  --  --  --  17.7 
Foreign Banks  324.2  --  154.0  15.2  -- 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  119.0  101.0  66.4  -- 
 Rural Credit Cooperatives   --  1,987.0  1,393.0  --  -- 
2001 
Big Four Banks  13,000.0  10,770.0 7,400.0  23.0  25.37 
Other Commercial Banks  3,259.0  2,530.7  1,649.8  12.9  -- 
   1) Joint Equity   2,386.0 1,849.0  1,224.0  10.5  12.94 
   2) City Commercial Banks  873.0  681.7  425.8  2.4  -- 
Foreign Banks  373.4  --  153.2  1.7  -- 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  128.7  107.1  72.5  2.6  -- 
Rural Credit Cooperatives   --  1,729.8  1,197.0  --  -- 
             
 69 
 
              Notes: 1. It is before tax profit up to 2006, and after tax profit from 2006-2009.                    
                    2.  Big four (stated owned) banks refer to Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and    
Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China. Big five banks are the Big four Banks and Bank of 
Communications.                                                                                                                                                      
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2000-2008, CEIC data base, Quarterly Monetary Report of PBC. 
 
Table 4-C  Comparison of Assets Held by China’s Non-Bank Intermediaries (RMB billion) 
 














1995  5,373.3 679.10 303.92  -- 458.60  48.97  536.91  42.90 
1996  6,582.7 870.66 374.78  -- 563.70  82.02  769.98  55.30 
1997 7,914.4  1,012.20  498.94  -- 636.40  100.42  948.61  75.80 
1998 8,860.9  1,143.11  560.63  -- 802.50  120.97  1,128.18  118.40 
1999 9,970.6  1,239.24  630.15  260.4 907.50  137.08  1,376.89  191.40 
2000 10,793.7  1,393.06  678.49  337.4 975.90  160.82  1,828.26  379.20 
2001 11,188.2  1,610.80  780.02  459.1 1,088.30  223.67  2,255.70  341.80 
2002 13,549.6  2,205.21  119.23  649.4 1,544.10  408.10  2,997.72  317.90 
2003 16,275.1  2,674.62  148.72  912.3 --  495.58  3,816.80  331.10 
2004 16,932.1  3,103.30  171.50  1185.4 --  --  4,697.20  515.90 
2005 21,005.0  3,142.7  203.3  1529.6 --  -- 6,502.2  715.5 
2006 24,23.0  3,450.3  183.1  1973.1 --  -- 8,038.4  927.9 
2007 28,007.0  4,343.4  131.2  2900.4 --  --  10,589.9  1,252.5 
2008 31,836.0  5,211.3  80.4  3341.8 --  --  12,941.2  1,344.8 
2009 40,089.0  5,492.5  27.2  4063.5     17,465.0  1,349.2 
 
Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People’s Bank of China (China’s Central Bank) and CEIC, 2000 – 2009.   
 
 
Table 5-A  A Comparison of the Largest Stock Markets in the World (01/01-12/31, 2010) 






1  NYSE Euronext (US)  13,394,081.8  57.0%  130.2% 
2  NASDAQ OMX  3,889,369.9  71.9%  340.4% 
3  Tokyo SE Group  3,827,774.2  60.1%  109.6% 
4  London SE Group  3,613,064.0  82.3%  76.1% 
5  NYSE Euronext (Europe)  2,930,072.4  68.9%  76.5% 
6  Shanghai SE  2,716,470.2  55.8%  178.5% 
7  Hong Kong Exchanges  2,711,316.2  69.4%  62.2% 
8  TSX Group  2,170,432.7  79.5%  74.1% 
9  Bombay SE  1,631,829.5  87.7%  18.1% 
10  National Stock Exchange India  1,596,625.3  69.6%  57.3% 
11  BM&FBOVESPA 1,545,565.7  64.2%  64.7% 
12  Australian Securities Exchange  1,454,490.6  79.4%  82.3% 
13  Deutsche Börse  1,429,719.1  78.4%  119.3% 
14  Shenzhen SE  1,311,370.1  31.2%  344.3% 
15  SIX Swiss Exchange  1,229,356.5  65.6%  73.5% 
16  BME Spanish Exchanges  1,171,625.0  NA  117.2% 
17  Korea Exchange  1,091,911.5  75.7%  176.3% 
18  NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange  1,042,153.7  69.7%  79.7% 
19  MICEX 949,148.9  64.3%  52.8% 
20  Johannesburg SE  925,007.2  35.0%  33.3% 
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Notes: All figures are from http//:www.world-exchanges.org, the web site of the international organization of stock exchanges.  
Concentration is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year coming from the turnover of the companies with the 
largest market cap (top 5%).  Turnover velocity is the total turnover of domestic stocks for the year expressed as a percentage of 
the total market capitalization. 
   
 
 
Table 5-B  China’s Bond Markets: 1990 – 2009 (Amount in RMB billion) 
 
This table presents the development of China’s bond markets.  “Policy Financial Bonds” are issued by “policy 
banks,” which belong to the Treasury Department, and the proceeds of bond issuance are invested in government run 
projects and industries such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the U.S.) 
 
  Treasury Bonds  Policy Financial Bonds  Corporate Bonds 













1990  19.72 7.62 89.03  6.44  5.01 8.49 12.4 7.73  19.54 
1991  28.13 11.16  106.00  6.69  3.37 11.81 24.9 11.43  33.11 
1992  46.08 23.81  128.27  5.50  3.00 14.31  68.37  19.28  82.20 
1993  38.13 12.33  154.07  0.00  3.43 10.88  23.58  25.55  80.24 
1994  113.76 39.19 228.64  0.00  1.35 9.53  16.18  28.20  68.21 
1995  151.09 49.70 330.03 --  --  170.85  30.08  33.63  64.66 
1996  184.78 78.66 436.14  105.56 25.45 250.96 26.89 31.78  59.77 
1997  241.18 126.43 550.89  143.15  31.23 362.88 25.52 21.98  52.10 
1998  380.88 206.09 776.57  195.02  32.04 512.11 15.00 10.53  67.69 
1999  401.50 123.87  1,054.20  180.09  47.32 644.75 15.82  5.65  77.86 
2000  465.70 152.50  1,367.40  164.50  70.92 738.33 8.30  0.00  86.16 
2001  488.40 228.60  1,561.80  259.00 143.88 853.45 14.70  0.00  100.86 
2002  593.43 226.12  1,933.60  307.50 155.57 1,005.41 32.50  0.00 133.36 
2003  628.01 275.58  2,260.36  456.14 250.53 1,165.00 35.80  0.00 169.16 
2004  692.39 374.99  2,577.76  414.80 177.87 1,401.93 32.70  0.00 201.86 
2005  704.20 404.55  2,877.40  585.17 205.30 1,781.80 204.65  3.70 401.81 
2006  888.33 620.86  3144.87  898.00  379.0 2,300.80  393.83 167.24  553.29 
2007  2313.91 584.68 4874.10  1109.02 413.36 2992.68 505.85 288.09  768.33 
2008  855.82 753.14  4976.78  1082.30  406.38 3668.6 843.54 327.78  1285.06 





24.4% 25.0%  29.7% 27.7%  40.1% 25.5% 22.3%  26.2% 
 
Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People’s Bank of China (China’s Central Bank) 2000 – 2009 and the Statistical 


























(G shares after 
recent reform 
and tradable) 
Shares that are controlled by the central government during the process when firms are 
converted into a limited liability corporation but before listing.  These shares are either 
managed and represented by the Bureau of National Assets Management or held by other 
state-owned companies, both of which also appoint firms’ board members.  After reforms 
announced in 2005 and implemented in 2006-7 state shares became G shares and are tradable.
Entrepreneur's 
shares 
Shares reserved for firms’ founders during the same process described above; different from 
shares that founders can purchase and sell in the markets. 
Foreign owners  Shares owned by foreign industrial investors during the same process 
Legal entity 
holders 
Shares sold to legal identities (such as other companies, listed or non-listed) during the same 
process. 





A Shares  Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange; most of these shares are sold to and held by Chinese (citizen) investors.  
B Shares  Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange; these shares are sold to and held by foreign investors; starting in 
2001Chinese investors can also trade these shares. 
H Shares  Shares issued by selected Chinese companies listed and traded in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange; these shares can only be traded on the HK Exchange but can be held by anyone. 
  
*: There are sub-categories under this definition 
 
Table 6-B   Tradable vs. Non-tradable Shares for China’s Listed Companies 
 











1992 0.41  0.69  0.31  0.16  0.52 
1993 0.49  0.72  0.28  0.16  0.57 
1994 0.43  0.67  0.33  0.21  0.64 
1995 0.39  0.64  0.36  0.21  0.60 
1996 0.35  0.65  0.35  0.22  0.62 
1997 0.32  0.65  0.35  0.23  0.66 
1998 0.34  0.66  0.34  0.24  0.71 
1999 0.43  0.65  0.35  0.26  0.75 
2000 0.44  0.64  0.36  0.28  0.80 
2001 0.50  0.64  0.36  0.29  0.80 
2002 0.52  0.65 0.35  0.26  0.74 
2003 0.57  0.64 0.35  0.27  0.76 
2004 0.58  0.64 0.36  0.28  0.77 
2005 0.57  0.62 0.38  0.30  0.78 
2006   0.36  0.65           0.35  0.27  0.81 
2007 0.37  0.69 0.31  0.28  0.90 
2008 0.47  0.58 0.42  0.37  0.91 
2009   0.49  0.53          0.47  0.50 0.98 
  
^: Non-tradable shares include “state-owned” and “shares owned by legal entities”;   
This column is calculated as “(Non-tradable in Shanghai SE+ Non-tradable in Shenzhen SE)/(Market cap in 
Shanghai SE + Market cap in Shenzhen SE)” 
*: tradable shares include  A, B, and H shares; 





Table 7  Trading Volume of National Interbank Market 
(RMB billion) 
 
Maturity  Overnight  7 days  20 days  30 days  60 days  90 days  120 days 
2001  103.88  560.69  93.35  35.28 9.40 4.73 0.87 
2002  201.52 852.34  100.35 29.17 10.78  4.76 11.81 
2003  641.89  1,456.31 56.60 44.11 10.14 10.18  2.81 
2004  283.34  1041.41  30.67  18.93 9.20 5.84 2.57 
2005  223.03 896.26 60.42 29.91  7.51 14.09  1.54 
2006   635.21    1290.43 38.13 19.11 12.03  5.22    1.41 
2007  8030.47    2178.01 50.16 34.16 27.94 31.80 13.34 
2008  10651.36    3500.47  110.71  113.55 44.52 66.61    18.50 
2009    16166.60       2134.79     102.15     204.84       53.80        71.00   62.3 
2010   24486.20      2426.90        65.01      161.30        46.61      134.02  19.75 
 

































(FDI, Capital Flows)   
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Figure 3  A Comparison of Performance of Major Stock Indexes  































































































































































































Figure 4-A  Total Real Estate Investments and their sources (1996-2009) 
 
Bottom part of the figure in the top panel is enlarged and plotted in the bottom panel, which presents 
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Figure 4-B  Total Floor Space (developed vs. sold) in China 
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Figure 5-A:  Comparing the growth of National Housing Prices and Disposable Household 




Figure 5-B:  Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Beijing 
 
National Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income
Normalized, base year=2002






































































































































































































































































































Beijing Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income
Normalized, base year=2002
adjusted by CPI, 2002=100  79
 Figure 5-C:  Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Shanghai 
 





















































































































































Shanghai Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income





















































































































































Shenzhen Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income
Normalized, base year=2002
adjusted by CPI, 2002=100  80

























































































































































Guanzhou Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income
Normalized, base year=2002
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Figure 7-A  Comparing the Sectors – Industrial Output 
 
In this figure we plot total “industrial output” for State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded firms) Sectors 
combined and for the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 2000 to 2008.  Data source for this table is the 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook (2000 – 2009).  
 
 
Figure 7-B  Comparing the Sectors – Employment 
 
 
In this figure we plot total number of workers employed by the State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded firms) 
Sectors combined and by the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 1990 to 2008.  Data source for this table is 





























































































































































































































































































































Foreign Exchange Reserve: Flows and Stocks
Monthly changes (LHS)
























































































































































Exchange Rate of RMB/USD and HK/USD (2000-Sept.2011)
RMB/USD
HK/USD